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authorroot <root@turin.home>2022-02-27 13:04:04 +0000
committerroot <root@turin.home>2022-02-27 13:04:04 +0000
commit48894535390d21794c5232b416759a02c0f4f1d2 (patch)
tree296368f581b398ff64095ed45f7a123e2ac48895
parentad2671533a35746193445fb676862f1d92719f55 (diff)
Changes is intro, doing todos/citations
-rwxr-xr-xmake4
-rw-r--r--paper.ms116
-rw-r--r--refer14
3 files changed, 74 insertions, 60 deletions
diff --git a/make b/make
index 15b35d4..439460f 100755
--- a/make
+++ b/make
@@ -19,8 +19,8 @@ cat paper.ms|\
cat formatting.ms target/temp |\
groff -Eket -Tpdf -ms -P-pa4 > target/paper.pdf
groff -Eket -Thtml -ms target/temp |\
- sed -E "s|([^\"\'\>=])(http[s]?://[^[:space:]]*)|\1<a href=\2>\2</a>|g" |\
- sed -E "s|^(http[s]?://[^[:space:]]*)|<a href=\1>\1</a>|g" |\
+ sed -E "s|([^\"\'\>=])(http[s]?://[^[:space:]]*)|\1<a href=\2>Available online</a>|g" |\
+ sed -E "s|^(http[s]?://[^[:space:]]*)|<a href=\1>Available online</a>|g" |\
sed "1,6d" > target/temp2
cat header.html target/temp2 |\
sed -E '36 i <a href="./paper.pdf">See this document as a pdf</a><br>'> target/paper.html
diff --git a/paper.ms b/paper.ms
index 73af97c..232e75b 100644
--- a/paper.ms
+++ b/paper.ms
@@ -11,54 +11,53 @@ February 2022
.LP
Modern encryption methods allow a level of privacy in communication
that has not before been seen: information that is encrypted cannot be
-decrypted without the necessary keys, which in the case of RSA is
-ensured by the large primes involved and the current intractability of
-large prime factorisation. This allows for communication that is
+decrypted without the necessary keys, such as with RSA where security
+is ensured by the large primes involved and the current intractability
+of prime factorisation. This allows for communication that is
practically guaranteed to be private: a relatively new phenomenon in
-communications, seen with inventions such as the one-tme pad {Rijmenants} (cite)
-which was cryptographically secure and used by the both the KGB and
-NSA (cite), beyond the use of the Enigma and Lorentz machines by the
-Nazis which were both of which were decrypted by cryptanalysis methods
-during the Second World War. Today, secure cryptographic methods are
-used not only by government backed agencies in preventing or
-practising espionage, but by individual citizens who are interested in
-their privacy, security, or are simply using a program that happens to
-encrypt their communications. Naturally, current availability of
-cryptography potentially allows for malicious actors such as criminals
-or terrorists to use encryption in order to commit crimes or acts of
-terror.
-In
-response to the threats of encryption and communications technology
-generally, governments have often engaged in signals intelligence
-(SIGINT) such as phone line tapping. Modern SIGINT initiatives have
-become incredibly complex and sophisticated and have grown greatly as
-popular adoption of technology has grown. Part of government interest
-in SIGINT is a direct response to perceived threads, such as the
-PATRIOT Act in the US which followed the 2001 terrorist attacks with
-the objective of strengthening national security (cite). Later, the
-FISA Amendments Act of 2008 further increased increased the powers of
-law enforcement to access information, such as allowing the Attorney
-General and Director of National Intelligence to provide information
-about individuals outside the United States {H.R. FISA congress}. It was,
-however, the PATRIOT Act and FISA Amendments Act that was the
-justification for large scale surveillance including the records of
-phone calls of customers of the Verizon network, including calls from
-the US to other states as well as calls localised entirely within the
-US {guardian greenwald verizon}{guardian NSA roberts}{times savage
-2013}. State sponsored SIGINT programmes such as that in the US aims
-to respond to encryption and other technological developments with the
-primary interest of overcoming it in order to prevent terror and
-crime. These measures have, however, had arguably limited
-effectiveness and have violated the privacy of individuals who are
-not suspected of being a threat to national security. Responses to
-encryption domestically and internationally will have significant
-consequences, given the potential importance of the information being
-communicated. Successful SIGINT and cryptanalysis by government
-agencies can successfully respond to modern threats of crime and
-terror. A failure of responsible governance, however may not only
-threaten the privacy of individuals unnecessarily, but also fail to
-respond to the ways in which criminals and terrorists are using
-encryption existing thereby only as a tool of authoritarian control.
+communications, seen with inventions such as the one-tme pad
+{Rijmenants} which was cryptographically secure and used by the both
+the KGB and NSA (cite), beyond the use of the Enigma and Lorentz
+machines by the Nazis which were both of which were decrypted by
+cryptanalysis methods during the Second World War. Today, secure
+cryptographic methods are used not only by government backed agencies
+in preventing or practising espionage, but by individual citizens who
+are interested in their privacy, security, or are simply using a
+program that happens to encrypt their communications. Naturally,
+current availability of cryptography potentially allows malicious
+actors such as criminals or terrorists to use encryption in order to
+commit crimes or acts of terror. In response to the threats of
+encryption and communications technology generally, governments have
+engaged in signals intelligence (SIGINT) such as phone line tapping.
+Modern SIGINT initiatives have become incredibly complex and
+sophisticated and have grown greatly as popular adoption of technology
+has grown. Part of government interest in SIGINT is a direct response
+to perceived threads, such as the PATRIOT Act in the US which followed
+the 2001 terrorist attacks with the objective of strengthening
+national security (cite). Later, the FISA Amendments Act of 2008
+further increased increased the powers of law enforcement to access
+information, such as allowing the Attorney General and Director of
+National Intelligence to gather information about individuals outside
+the United States {H.R. FISA congress}. It was, however, the PATRIOT
+Act and FISA Amendments Act that was the justification for large scale
+surveillance including the government access of phone calls records of
+customers of the Verizon network, including calls from the US to other
+states as well as calls localised entirely within the US {guardian
+greenwald verizon}{guardian NSA roberts}{times savage 2013}. State
+sponsored SIGINT programs such as that in the US aims to respond to
+encryption and other technological developments with the primary
+interest of overcoming it in order to prevent terror and crime. These
+measures have, however, had arguably limited effectiveness and have
+violated the privacy of individuals who are not suspected of being a
+threat to national security. Responses to encryption domestically and
+internationally will have significant consequences, given the
+potential importance of the information being communicated. Successful
+SIGINT and cryptanalysis by government agencies can successfully
+respond to modern threats of crime and terror. A failure of
+responsible governance, however may not only threaten the privacy of
+individuals unnecessarily, but also fail to respond to the ways in
+which criminals and terrorists are using encryption existing thereby
+only as a tool of authoritarian control.
An argument is often made against allowing widespread use of
encryption and generally against widespread effective operations
@@ -191,19 +190,20 @@ variety of hardware within a single computer is a rather interesting
and potentially worrying development, particularly with the clear
level influence, interest, and competitiveness both the US {US House
chip manufacturing bill} and Chinese governments (cite) are
-respectively showing (the US and China are the two largest chip
-manufacturers (cite, reword)). In light of potential issues with
+respectively showing. In light of potential issues with
hardware in a privacy sense, there have been developments in `open
hardware'.
-RISC V is an instruction set for processors from the University of
-California, Berkeley; opposed to ARM, Intel, and AMD, RISC V is an open
-standard. This allows for open source CPU designs, such as
+RISC-V is an instruction set for processors from the University of
+California at Berkeley; opposed to ARM, Intel, and AMD, RISC-V is an open
+standard {case for RISC-V}. This allows for open source CPU
+implementatios, such as
those designed at UC Berkeley, as well as those from other parties,
-such as Alibaba Group (cite all). A significant amount of existing
-software has been ported to the RISC V platform (cite) and been
-implemented commercially by companies such as Google, for a security
-module in the `Pixel 6' smartphone (cite). This attention and interest
+such as Alibaba Group {chen risc}. A significant amount of existing
+software has been ported to the RISC-V platform (cite) and alongisde
+the Alibaba implementation for data centres the standard has been used
+by Google for a security
+module in the 'Pixel 6' smartphone (cite). This attention and interest
in the technology potentially indicates a shift in attitude and want
for more open hardware and a general concern for the source of
computing equipment. Examples, such as a laptop created by the
@@ -213,7 +213,7 @@ media coverage (cite) further show an interest from the public in open
hardware. An argument can be made that such projects are for niche
interest groups only, and that such solutions will never see the
commercial success seen by the larger, non-open manufacturers such as
-Intel and ARM, however clear adoption of standards such as RISC V by
+Intel and ARM, however clear adoption of standards such as RISC-V by
large institutions (cite) as well as the clear interest the public
have demonstrated in commercially available open solutions (research,
cite) demonstrate quite the opposite: that open hardware will continue
@@ -292,7 +292,7 @@ state surveillance. Measures taken by governments to prevent this
development will doubtless be limited unless extreme actions such as
those seen in China are taken. Otherwise, development will continue to
occur in both free and non free societies in support of individual
-freedoms. The assertion of `Linus' law` that "given enough eyeballs,
+freedoms. The assertion of "Linus' law" that , "given enough eyeballs,
all bugs are shallow" (cite - CathBaz) creates a serious inability
for actors such as governments to engineer backdoors into software as
the NSA previously has (cite) or to prevent the development of
diff --git a/refer b/refer
index e4e418c..fbe658e 100644
--- a/refer
+++ b/refer
@@ -247,3 +247,17 @@
%J Karlstad University
%G arXiv:1204.0447 [cs.CR]
%D Apr 2012
+
+%A Chen Chen^et^al
+%T Xuantie-910: A Commercial Multi-Core 12-Stage Pipeline Out-of-Order 64-bit High Performance RISC-V Processor with Vector Extension
+%D 2020
+%J ACM/IEEE 47th Annual International Symposium on Computer Architecture (ISCA)
+%O DOI: 10.1109/isca45697.2020.00016
+
+%T Instruction Sets Should Be Free: The Case For RISC-V
+%A Krste Asanović
+%A David A. Patterson
+%J Electrical Engineering and Computer Sciences
+%C University of California at Berkeley
+%R UCB/EECS-2014-146
+%D Aug 2014