diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'paper.ms')
| -rw-r--r-- | paper.ms | 127 |
1 files changed, 58 insertions, 69 deletions
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ short-label D.y sort .R2 .TL -Cryptography, crime, terror, and surveillance +\f[B]Cryptography, crime, terror, and surveillance .AU \f[R]Mohit Agarwal .AI @@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ decrypted without the necessary keys, with algorithms such as RSA where security is ensured by the large primes involved and the current intractability of prime factorisation. This allows for communication that is practically guaranteed to be private; a relatively new phenomenon in -communications. In the past this has been seen with the one-time pad +communications. In the past, this has been seen with the one-time pad {Rijmenants} which was cryptographically secure and used by both the KGB and NSA, well beyond the use of the Enigma and Lorentz machines by the Nazis which were both decrypted through @@ -33,9 +33,9 @@ Modern Sigint initiatives have become rather complex and sophisticated and have grown greatly alongside the popular adoption of information technology. Part of government interest in Sigint is a direct response -to perceived threads, such as the PATRIOT Act in the US which followed +to perceived threats, such as the PATRIOT Act in the US which followed the 2001 terrorist attacks with the objective of strengthening -national security (cite). Later, the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 +national security {PATRIOT ACT Congress}. Later, the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 further increased the powers of law enforcement to access information, such as allowing the Attorney General and Director of National Intelligence to gather information about individuals outside @@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ prevalence of electronic communication methods. Successful Sigint and cryptanalysis by government agencies can respond to modern threats of crime and terror. A failure of responsible governance, however, may not only threaten the privacy of -individuals unnecessarily, but also fail to respond to the ways in +individuals unnecessarily but also fail to respond to the ways in which criminals and terrorists are using encryption, existing thereby only as a tool of authoritarian control. @@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ An argument is often made against allowing widespread use of encryption and generally against widespread effective operations security (OPSEC) in the public sector in the interest of national security and the prevention of terror. With access to -communications and usage history governments can gather significant +communications and usage history, governments can gather significant information on terrorists and use this intelligence against terrorists. It is clear that intelligence and surveillance play a significant role in counterterrorism. The 9/11 terrorist attacks are seen potentially as a @@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ September 2001 (chapter 8). The report details institutional failures and also emphasised the difficulty and importance of intelligence in counterterrorism {intelligence and national security}. Graham{#CTC terrorists} explores the use of encryption by terrorists which is -often cited in a reason for giving governments access to unencrypted +often cited as a reason for giving governments access to unencrypted Internet communications so that suspicious activity can be flagged and investigated in order to prevent a terror attack or in order to better respond in the case of an attack. Graham describes the extensive use @@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ of encryption by terrorists, including a program that built a wrapper around the popular, secure, and open source PGP called \fIMujahedeen Secrets\fR by al-Qaeda. Although now terrorists and criminals use widely available, popular, and user-friendly software such as the Tails -operating system or Telegram (Graham citation 28), terrorists +operating system or Telegram (Graham citation 28), terrorist organisations have shown an ability to make use of more obscure and complicated systems, as well as to use publicly available source code in order to construct software for operatives to use. @@ -104,15 +104,15 @@ end-to-end encryption in industry, we will not be able to prevent those attempting to evade the law from doing so, as shown in the case of terrorist organisations who have used more obscure software in the past and also in the case of the abundance of illegal activity that -occurs on the so called \[oq]dark web\[cq] in the form of the trade of drugs and -child pornography among others {gulati deep web}. Instead the +occurs on the so-called \[oq]dark web\[cq] in the form of the trade of drugs and +child pornography among others {gulati deep web}. Instead, the limitation of use of encryption on popular software will only decrease the privacy of those uninterested in criminal activity and instead using more popular software without regard for its security features or lack thereof. The information exposed by Edward Snowden in 2013 demonstrates that the US government has processed and collected vast amounts of unencrypted data and possibly -continues to do so. In the case of unencrypted communication the +continues to do so. In the case of unencrypted communication, the problem remains and preventing end-to-end encryption will simply allow governments to maintain the status quo of being able to intercept and read all communications between their citizens and individuals outside @@ -136,16 +136,16 @@ in the GDR it was closer to one informant or officer for every 63 citizens. Those living in the GDR often had experiences involving investigation by the Stasi and there was clearly an understanding amongst citizens that one had to be wary of an -informant or agent listening in {funder}. In modern Western society +informant or agent listening in {funder}. In modern Western society, there is a similar collective understanding that governments carry out surveillance on a massive scale on their own citizens. A key distinction today, however, is that this work is not carried out by a vast network of informants, there are no kilometres of paper, and there are no -collections of film and photograph {The Federal Archives} documenting and aiding the +collections of film and photographs {The Federal Archives} documenting and aiding the surveillance of the authorities. Instead, the level of surveillance that large, secretive groups of individuals once had to carry out in -order to enable a surveillance state can be performed instead through +order to enable a surveillance state can be performed through bureaucracies and technological methods. In modern times, governments can operate with a very limited number of operatives \[oq]on the ground\[cq] and instead focus attention on the giant amounts of data @@ -165,12 +165,12 @@ Yet encryption presents unique challenges to lawmakers. Not only will encryption be difficult to regulate due to its rapid development, but perhaps expressly due to its decentralised nature, where a government cannot prevent the existence of software -that enables encryption which is open source and reproducible +that enables encryption that is open source and reproducible internationally. Just as media piracy through torrents and access to hidden services over Tor are able to evade regulation, regulation of encryption may prove impossible. An arguably useful tool to the authorities does exist in the hardware and infrastructure that users -of the Internet rely on. In the West a small number of companies (such +of the Internet rely on. In the West, a small number of companies (such as Intel, Nvidia, Arm and Apple) design and produce the majority of hardware in a proprietary and closed source manner. @@ -178,7 +178,7 @@ Concerns have already been expressed with regard to the Intel Management Engine {Intel Management portnoy} that exists on modern processors produced by Intel. Arguments have been made that the Intel Management Engine already acts -as a backdoor for government agencies (cite), and the potential is +as a backdoor for government agencies {TechRepublic backdoor}, and the potential is clearly there for US government interests in mass data collection and Sigint following 9/11 to lead to the introduction of backdoors in popular technology. We are aware that in the case of the Intel @@ -192,32 +192,33 @@ software \[en] use, leaving them open to exploitation from either state or private actors. Furthermore, there is a visible interest in increasing the presence of technologies on the hardware level, including the aforementioned Intel Management Engine, the Trusted -Platform Module (cite), and recently Microsoft's Pluton (cite) -subsystem which will be present on hardware sold in the future. This +Platform Module {TPM Verge}, and recently Microsoft's Pluton {pluton +goodin} subsystem which will be present on hardware sold in the future. This variety of hardware within a single computer is a rather interesting and potentially worrying development, particularly with the clear -level influence, interest, and competitiveness both the US {US House +level of influence, interest, and competitiveness both the US {US House chip manufacturing bill} and Chinese governments have in their respective national chip manufacturing industries. In light of potential issues with hardware, there have been developments in \[oq]open hardware\[cq]. RISC-V is an instruction set for processors from the University of -California at Berkeley; opposed to Arm, Intel, and AMD processors, +California at Berkeley; as opposed to Arm, Intel, and AMD processors, RISC-V is an open standard for CPU design {case for RISC-V}. This allows for open source CPU implementations, such as those designed at UC Berkeley, as well as those from other parties, such as Alibaba Group {chen risc}. A significant amount of existing software has been ported to the RISC-V platform and alongside the Alibaba implementation for data centres, the standard has been used by Google for a security module in the -\[oq]Pixel 6\[cq] smartphone (cite). This attention and interest +\[oq]Pixel 6\[cq] smartphone {Pixel 6 Security Blog}. This attention and interest potentially signals a shift towards increased demand for and utility in open hardware for privacy, security or economic reasons. Another poignant example of open hardware is the laptop created by the manufacturer Framework Computer Inc, which is designed to be more expandable, serviceable and repairable than other laptops available on the market. The company and laptop gained significant media coverage -(cite) showing an interest from the public in open hardware. An +{Financial Times right to repair}{Wirecutter Framework} showing an +interest from the public in open hardware. An argument can be made that such projects are for niche interest groups only and that such solutions will never see the commercial success seen by the larger, non-open manufacturers. @@ -237,7 +238,7 @@ preventing such investigation to occur. For governments, this is arguably the result of such heavy surveillance in the first place. It is clear that knowledge such as the 2013 Snowden leaks had an impact on the public and people are thereby more interested in -their privacy and preventing surveillance. Around the world +their privacy and preventing surveillance. Around the world, individuals use tools to increase their privacy and anonymity when using the Internet as well as to overcome censorship of information by governments. A major exception to the availability of the free @@ -249,17 +250,17 @@ users to circumvent measures put in place by the government {firewall}{talbot tor china}{winter china tor}. Measures in China have enabled the government to tightly control and monitor the flow of information via the Internet; ensuring that citizens can only access -that which the ruling part should allow. Whether such draconian +that which the ruling party should allow. Whether such draconian measures could even be implemented in the more democratic West is questionable, but the opportunity clearly exists for governments to -undermine the digital privacy of its citizens. Any such measures, +undermine the digital privacy of their citizens. Any such measures, however, will face scrutiny from the media and public in Western society and thereby open software such as Tor is used to freely share significant amounts of information away from the observation of law enforcement, allowing illegal activity to occur {gulati}. The reduced ability for law enforcement to investigate crime will clearly have an impact by allowing criminals to act with additional impunity. In -particular, the sharing child sexual abuse material, trafficking and +particular, the sharing of child sexual abuse material, trafficking and other such crimes that are enabled by the Internet present reason for concern. @@ -284,11 +285,11 @@ The rate of development in unconventional computing methods is increasing rapidly. Effective quantum computing will result in existing popular cryptographic algorithms such as RSA, which is used for communications and digital signatures, no longer being -secure {Lily Chen quantum}. +secure {Lily Chen quantum 2016}. Significant research in recent years has shown feasibility in current ideas surrounding quantum computing and promising results in development towards quantum supremacy and the -future the breakdown of current cryptographic methods. +future breakdown of current cryptographic methods. Indeed, both in the US at Google {google supremacy nature} and in China at a major university {china quantum advantage}{science photons quantum advantage}, @@ -323,14 +324,15 @@ governments has arguably prompted more independent development in the public sphere: the US National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) made a public request for -nominations of post-quantum cryptographic algorithms (cite), leading +nominations of post-quantum cryptographic algorithms {call for +proposals}, leading to standards that will clearly influence future lawmaking. This adoption of open processes and the open auditing and implementation of future cryptographic standards is most striking when compared with the \fIDual_EC_DRBG\fR algorithm. This algorithm, which contained a vulnerability, was included in NIST standards. The vulnerability allowed the NSA to potentially decrypt -Internet traffic such as e-mails (cite). The NSA also allegedly paid +Internet traffic such as e-mails. The NSA also allegedly paid the firm RSA Security in order to implement the algorithm with its backdoor in their popular security products {menn nsa contract} and although the NSA @@ -345,9 +347,9 @@ development of technology that enables strong encryption and overcomes state surveillance. Measures taken by governments to prevent this development will doubtless be limited unless extreme actions such as those seen in China are taken. Otherwise, development will continue to -occur in both free and non free societies in support of individual -freedoms. The assertion of \[oq]Linus' law\[cq] that , \[lq]given enough eyeballs, -all bugs are shallow\[rq] (cite - CathBaz) creates a serious inability +occur in both free and non-free societies in support of individual +freedoms. The assertion of \[oq]Linus' law\[cq] that, \[lq]given enough eyeballs, +all bugs are shallow\[rq] creates a serious inability for actors such as governments to engineer backdoors into software as the NSA previously has or to prevent the development of software altogether. On the other hand, the vast @@ -360,36 +362,37 @@ courts and law enforcement alongside their replies online (cite). Demonstrating their respect for user privacy and that they are unable to release data as they do not collect it is perhaps something that users are finding more appealing. Indeed, when Apple refused to unlock -a phone for the FBI following a terrorist attack (cite) it gained -significant media attention and demonstrated that the defence of users +a phone for the FBI following a terrorist attack it gained +significant media attention and demonstrated that the defence of users' privacy was a virtue for modern businesses, regardless of the fact that the FBI was able to unlock the phone independently, which was -rather overlooked. To users today, both to those with experience and +rather overlooked {Cook 2016}{FBI encryption Apple Guardian}. To +users today, both those with experience and ability in technology and to the general public, privacy is -seemingly becoming a major selling point and significant factor in the +seemingly becoming a major selling point and a significant factor in the way individuals chose to use technology. Modern cryptographic algorithms are theoretically secure; the underlying concepts mean that breaking the encryption to intercept a communication is not possible in a reasonable amount of time with current computational limits -and is therefore, due to the nature of the algorithm, secure. This +and is, therefore, due to the nature of the algorithm, secure. This, however, does not consider implementational flaws. Indeed, implementational flaws are the ways in which modern exploits of -algorithms such as RSA (cite) occur, and methods such as timing -attacks (cite) and voltage level analysis attacks, as well as memory -attacks (cold boot, rubber hose ...) (do some light explaining) (cite -all) have the potential to overcome any level of theoretical sophistication that +algorithms such as RSA occur, and methods such as timing +attacks and voltage level analysis attacks, as well as memory +attacks {Wong Timing attacks}{Barenghi Low Voltage}{RSA Key Cache} have +the potential to overcome any level of theoretical sophistication that cryptographic algorithms may have, and simply give away information -such as keys (research, cite). In addition to this, there can be +such as keys. In addition to this, there can be implementational issues in hardware, such as the recent Spectre vulnerability which was discovered in 2018; revealing data to -an attacker due to flaws speculative execution which speeds up processing in +an attacker due to flaws in speculative execution which speeds up processing in modern processors. The vulnerability allowed for the attack of cryptographic implementations such as GPG. This is potentially even more concerning given that processor implementations are proprietary. -This flaw affects practically every modern processor and -indicates the vulnerability in computer hardware, which could be +This flaw, which affects practically every modern processor and +indicates the potential for vulnerability in computer hardware, could be exploited by any party with sufficient resources. Intel has released multiple patches for Spectre, however, there remain concerns that there is a potential for attacks in modern processors including new @@ -407,19 +410,19 @@ funding received by the NSA, and quite possibly the level of surveillance carried out by the NSA. Thus, discussions in public or private spheres are unlikely to influence decisions made inside already secretive agencies where -governments are ready to except that sacrifices must be made for the +governments are ready to accept that sacrifices must be made for the greater good. Of course, the issue arises when surveillance exists that does not exist simply to protect a nation, but instead mass, indiscriminate surveillance is carried out on citizens not suspected of any criminal or terrorist activity such as the Tempora -program in the United Kingdom {guardian fibre-optic}, +programme in the United Kingdom {guardian fibre-optic}, however governments nonetheless prove willing to fund the activities of surveillance agencies and will seemingly continue to do so regardless of public opinion. .HLINE -The executive summary to the 9/11 Commission Report {#9/11 commission +The executive summary of the 9/11 Commission Report {#9/11 commission report} describes the September 2001 terrorist attacks as \[oq]a shock, not a surprise\[cq]. In a similar light, the release of information relating to mass surveillance and mishandling of data such as the 2013 @@ -436,7 +439,7 @@ arguably has moved itself towards encrypted standards. Open source initiatives have pioneered free implementations of secure cryptographic standards, allowing any user to use these tools directly in order to send information, such as the popular PGP -implementation GPG. Additionally the open implementation of +implementation GPG. Additionally, the open implementation of cryptographic tools enables developers to integrate secure versions of these tools into new programs, allowing for the easy development of programs that allow encrypted communications. The demand for @@ -456,10 +459,10 @@ communications and state sponsored espionage. Governments maintain up to date cryptographic systems in order to keep their own secure, yet fight hard against encryption in the name of national security. In some ways this is a valid -argument: availability of cryptography arguably lowers the +argument: the availability of cryptography arguably lowers the barrier to entry for terror or crime and reduces the ability law enforcement has to deal with it. Nonetheless, it seems that reducing -the availability of encryption to the pubic would not decrease the +the availability of encryption to the public would not decrease the opportunity for criminals or terrorists to do harm. Often we see two possible future realities: one with a perfect @@ -477,9 +480,9 @@ highly invasive state surveillance. Yet media coverage of criminals and terrorists using technology and encryption, particularly following events of terror; media and government discussing the risks of technology; and the coverage of law enforcement using surveillance -tools to stop criminals shape our view of the latter scenario. I feel +tools to stop criminals shape our view of the latter scenario. I feel, however, that this is a fallacious dichotomy that we have collectively -created. In the West it seems that we have come to far for complete +created. In the West, it seems that we have come too far for complete surveillance to be effectively implemented, as the tools to overcome such a regime already exist and there is a widespread sentiment of resistance amongst the public and in governments and courts against @@ -514,17 +517,3 @@ difficult to access for the public. .nr HY 0 .ad l -IME/Pluton -- backdoors - https://www.techrepublic.com/article/is-the-intel-management-engine-a-backdoor/ - https://www.techrepublic.com/article/why-the-nsa-may-not-need-backdoors/ - -Government - https://rules.house.gov/bill/117/hr-4521 . - -https://ooni.org/post/2021-italy-blocks-gutenberg-book-publishing-website/#findings -https://ooni.org/post/2021-how-signal-private-messenger-blocked-around-the-world/ -https://www.technologyreview.com/2012/04/04/186902/how-china-blocks-the-tor-anonymity-network/ -https://ooni.org/post/2021-russia-blocks-tor/ . - -Todo: - program -> programme |