diff options
| author | root <root@turin.home> | 2022-02-06 21:51:32 +0000 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | root <root@turin.home> | 2022-02-06 21:51:32 +0000 |
| commit | ea62f14753f24cfd81c94b3f967abfc153f0294d (patch) | |
| tree | 96df65347d61b9cf55b21920730bc1c42b5e5973 /paper.ms | |
| parent | 2b747d8059afe9a65a6d3741320fa25c15990211 (diff) | |
Expanding on Intel Management Engine.
Diffstat (limited to 'paper.ms')
| -rw-r--r-- | paper.ms | 37 |
1 files changed, 30 insertions, 7 deletions
@@ -1,3 +1,7 @@ +.R1 +short-label D.y +sort spec +.R2 .TL Title .AU @@ -10,6 +14,10 @@ A problem (instability), a solution is this a fair question to argue define objectives +.br +How should we deal with encryption? +.br +What does the future hold for encryption? topic sentences? @@ -48,8 +56,8 @@ An argument is often made against digital privacy in the interest of national security. With access to communications and usage history law enforcement and government can quickly discover large amounts of information useful in a criminal investigation or in preventing -criminal activity. Graham explores the use of encryption by terrorists -{CTC terrorists} which is often cited in a reason for giving +criminal activity. Graham{#CTC terrorists} explores the use of +encryption by terrorists which is often cited in a reason for giving governments access to unencrypted Internet communications so that suspicious activity can be flagged and investigated in order to prevent a terror attack or in order to better respond in the case of @@ -140,11 +148,26 @@ provide them with the ability to access information directly from the target's hardware rather than having to intercept information in transit. This would go for other hardware vendors such as AMD or ARM also. Whether or not companies such as Intel would open backdoors to -governments is up for debate, however we are aware that authorities -have requested backdoor access from hardware manufacturers in the past -(cite). Nonetheless, the potential exists for systems built into -non-open hardware which most people, even those using open software -use. +governments is up for debate, however we are aware that in the case of +the Intel Management there was potentially an ability for it to be +disabled by US government authorities such as the NSA, demonstrating a +level of leverage the US government potentially has over organisations +including but not limited to Intel {register kill switch}{intel me +bleepingcomputer}. +Regardless of the level of influence governments might or +might not hold over private corporations, the potential exists for +systems built into non-open hardware which most people, even those +using open software use, leaving them more open to exploitation from +either state or private actors. Furthermore, there is a visible +interest in increasing the presence of technologies on the hardware +level, including the aforementioned Intel Management Engine, the +Trusted Platform Module (cite), and recently Microsoft's Pluton (cite) +subsystem, which will be present on hardware sold in the future. This +variety of hardware within a single computer is a rather interesting +and potentially worrying development, particularly with the clear +influence and interest both the US and Chinese governments (cite +both) are respectively showing (the US and China are the two largest +chip manufacturers (cite, reword)). Is discussion on this useful? Individuals around the world have clearly expressed interest in |
