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authorroot <root@turin.home>2022-04-04 15:31:38 +0100
committerroot <root@turin.home>2022-04-04 15:31:38 +0100
commitb086c533b48e8ac43267c15bbe72bf1b60eb8211 (patch)
treed9368c4ff8d1061c442a7b75f15d406f9e6d32d9
parentaa224c53501208b3e7fa6ea3828598cb6f238b68 (diff)
Todos and proofreading.
-rw-r--r--header.html5
-rw-r--r--macros2
-rwxr-xr-xmake4
-rw-r--r--paper.ms75
-rw-r--r--refer22
5 files changed, 73 insertions, 35 deletions
diff --git a/header.html b/header.html
index 52234c4..a6f49ce 100644
--- a/header.html
+++ b/header.html
@@ -17,4 +17,9 @@ body{margin-top:10%}
a:link, a:visited {color: #aab9c1;}
a:hover, a:active {color: hotpink;}
}
+hr{
+ margin-top: 2.5rem;
+ margin-bottom: 2.5em;
+ width: 90%;
+}
</style>
diff --git a/macros b/macros
index 69a869a..ae30f94 100644
--- a/macros
+++ b/macros
@@ -8,6 +8,6 @@
.\" * Horizontal line
.de HLINE
.ce
-\f[CI]~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~\fR
+\f[CI]~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~\fR
.ec
..
diff --git a/make b/make
index 7e13522..9f8cd7f 100755
--- a/make
+++ b/make
@@ -20,10 +20,12 @@ cat paper.ms|\
perl -0pe 's/\n\n\n/\n\n/g' |
cat macros - > target/temp
cat formatting.ms target/temp |\
+ tr '~' '-' |\
groff -Eket -Tpdf -ms -P-pa4 > target/paper.pdf
groff -Eket -Thtml -ms target/temp |\
sed -E "s|([^\"\'\>=])(http[s]?://[^[:space:]]*)|\1<a href=\2>Available online</a>|g" |\
sed -E "s|^(http[s]?://[^[:space:]]*)|<a href=\1>Available online</a>|g" |\
+ sed 's/.*~~~~.*/<hr>/' |\
sed "1,6d" > target/temp2
cat header.html target/temp2 |\
- sed -E '36 i <a href="./paper.pdf">See this document as a pdf</a><br>'> target/paper.html
+ sed -E '41 i <a href="./paper.pdf">See this document as a pdf</a><br>'> target/paper.html
diff --git a/paper.ms b/paper.ms
index 698ef59..c432bc8 100644
--- a/paper.ms
+++ b/paper.ms
@@ -15,10 +15,10 @@ decrypted without the necessary keys, such as with RSA where security
is ensured by the large primes involved and the current intractability
of prime factorisation. This allows for communication that is
practically guaranteed to be private: a relatively new phenomenon in
-communications, seen with inventions such as the one-tme pad
-{Rijmenants} which was cryptographically secure and used by the both
-the KGB and NSA (cite), beyond the use of the Enigma and Lorentz
-machines by the Nazis which were both of which were decrypted by
+communications, seen with inventions such as the one-time pad
+{Rijmenants} which was cryptographically secure and used by both
+the KGB and NSA, beyond the use of the Enigma and Lorentz
+machines by the Nazis which were both decrypted by
cryptanalysis methods during the Second World War. Today, secure
cryptographic methods are used not only by government backed agencies
in preventing or practising espionage, but by individual citizens who
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ has grown. Part of government interest in SIGINT is a direct response
to perceived threads, such as the PATRIOT Act in the US which followed
the 2001 terrorist attacks with the objective of strengthening
national security (cite). Later, the FISA Amendments Act of 2008
-further increased increased the powers of law enforcement to access
+further increased the powers of law enforcement to access
information, such as allowing the Attorney General and Director of
National Intelligence to gather information about individuals outside
the United States {H.R. FISA congress}. It was, however, the PATRIOT
@@ -140,12 +140,13 @@ attempting to carry out surveillance on a massive scale on their own
citizens. A key distinction today, however, is that
this work is not carried out by a vast network of informants,
there are no gargantuan gargantuan stores of paper, and there are no
-hundreds of miles of film (cite all) documenting and aiding the
+collections of film and photograph {The Federal Archives} documenting and aiding the
surveillance of the authorities. Instead, the level of surveillance
that large, secretive groups of individuals once had to carry out in
order to enable a surveillance state can be performed instead through
bureaucracies and technological methods. In modern times, governments
-can operate with a very limited number of operatives 'on the ground',
+can operate with a very limited number of operatives \[oq]on the
+ground\[cq],
and instead focus attention on the giant amounts of data they have for
processing in order to make the findings they intend to: be it crime,
terrorism, or \[en] as was the case with the Gestapo and Stasi - descent.
@@ -193,7 +194,7 @@ subsystem, which will be present on hardware sold in the future. This
variety of hardware within a single computer is a rather interesting
and potentially worrying development, particularly with the clear
level influence, interest, and competitiveness both the US {US House
-chip manufacturing bill} and Chinese governments (cite) have in the
+chip manufacturing bill} and Chinese governments have in the
chip manufacturing industry. In light of potential issues with
hardware, there have been developments in \[oq]open hardware\[cq].
@@ -203,7 +204,7 @@ RISC-V is an open standard for CPU design {case for RISC-V}. This allows for ope
source CPU implementations, such as those designed at UC Berkeley, as
well as those from other parties, such as Alibaba Group {chen risc}. A
significant amount of existing software has been ported to the RISC-V
-platform (cite) and alongisde the Alibaba implementation for data
+platform and alongisde the Alibaba implementation for data
centres, the standard has been used by Google for a security module in
the \[oq]Pixel 6\[cq] smartphone (cite).
This attention and interest potentially signals a shift towards
@@ -229,12 +230,12 @@ Movement towards open standards in both hardware and software
reveals a problem for law enforcement
agencies and counterterrorism forces. The tools of mass surveillance
that once enabled investigation into crime or terror such as reading
-messages/emails, listening to calls, tracking location, or analysing
+messages/e-mails, listening to calls, tracking location, or analysing
metadata may no longer be effective, thereby potentially
preventing such investigation to occur. For governments, this is
arguably the result of such heavy surveillance in the first place.
It is clear that knowledge such as the 2013 Snowden leaks had an impact
-on the public (cite), and people are therby more interested in
+on the public, and people are therby more interested in
their privacy and preventing surveillance. Around the world
individuals use tools to increase their privacy and anonymity when
using the Internet, as well as to overcome censorship of information
@@ -321,13 +322,13 @@ public sphere:
the US National
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) made a public request for
nominations of post-quantum cryptographic algorithms (cite), leading
-to standards that will clearly influence future lawmaking (cite).
+to standards that will clearly influence future lawmaking.
This adoption of open processes and the
open auditing and implementation of future cryptographic standards is
most striking when compared with the \fIDual_EC_DRBG\fR algorithm.
This algorithm, which contained a vulnerability, was included in NIST
standards. This vulnerability allowed the NSA to potentially decrypt
-Internet traffic such as emails (cite). The NSA also allegedly paid
+Internet traffic such as e-mails (cite). The NSA also allegedly paid
the firm RSA Security in order to implement the algorithm with its
backdoor in their
popular security products {menn nsa contract} and although the NSA
@@ -346,7 +347,7 @@ occur in both free and non free societies in support of individual
freedoms. The assertion of \[oq]Linus' law\[cq] that , \[lq]given enough eyeballs,
all bugs are shallow\[rq] (cite - CathBaz) creates a serious inability
for actors such as governments to engineer backdoors into software as
-the NSA previously has (cite) or to prevent the development of
+the NSA previously has or to prevent the development of
software altogether (find example). On the other hand, the vast
majority of the software and hardware used by the general public is
proprietary. For many, this will continue to be the norm. Yet, the
@@ -380,8 +381,9 @@ governments are ready to except that sacrifices must be made for the
greater good. Of course, the issue arises when surveillance exists
that does not exist simply to protect a nation, but instead mass,
indiscriminate surveillance is carried out on citizens not suspected
-of any criminal or terrorist activity such as the Optic Nerve
-program in the United Kingdom (cite), however governments nonetheless
+of any criminal or terrorist activity such as the Tempora
+program in the United Kingdom {guardian fibre-optic},
+however governments nonetheless
prove willing to fund the activities of surveillance agencies.
Modern cryptographic algorithms are theoretically secure; the
@@ -420,15 +422,16 @@ relating to mass surveillance and mishandling of data such as the 2013
Edward Snowden releases ought to also be potentially considered a
shock, not a surprise given the level of data that both governments
and private organisations have access to and responsibility for.
-Encryption enables people to trust that their data that they wish to
-be private truly is and allows companies to handle communications
-such as e-mails without having to consider secure storage or giving
-data to law enforcement due to the fact the company itself is unable
-to read the data if it is end-to-end encrypted. The free market
+Encryption enables people to trust companies and governments with
+the handling of communications
+such as e-mails and enables companies to be able to work with law
+enforecement without compromising user privacy as encrypted data
+cannot be read and is therefore useless to authorities.
+The free market
arguably has moved itself towards encrypted standards. Open source
initiatives have pioneered free implementations of secure
cryptographic standards, allowing any user to use these tools directly
-in order to send information, as occurs with the popular PGP
+in order to send information, such as the popular PGP
implementation GPG. Additionally the open implementation of
cryptographic tools enables developers to integrate secure versions of
these tools into new programs, allowing for the easy development of
@@ -448,9 +451,9 @@ conduct critical communications and the breaking of those ciphers were
critical to the Allies, encryption remains critical to government
communications and state sponsored espionage. Governments maintain up
to date cryptographic systems in order to keep their own
-communications secure, yet fight hard against encryption in the name
-of national security and to fight crime. In some ways this is a valid
-argument: wide availability to cryptography arguably lowers the
+secure, yet fight hard against encryption in the name
+of national security. In some ways this is a valid
+argument: availability of cryptography arguably lowers the
barrier to entry for terror or crime and reduces the ability law
enforcement has to deal with it. Nonetheless, it seems that reducing
the availability of encryption to the pubic would not decrease the
@@ -465,8 +468,9 @@ and rights of the people. In the later criminals are able to use
technology both to hide their activities and enable their crimes
without fear of police interference; creating a near anarchic
existence. It seems that in the West, representations of the former in
-dystopian cultural works such as those by George Orwell, Isaac Asimov,
-Arthur C. Clarke or Margaret Atwood, alongside journalistic coverage of
+dystopian cultural works such as those by George Orwell,
+Arthur C. Clarke or Margaret Atwood, popular culture such as world
+presented to us in \fIBlade Runner\fR, alongside journalistic coverage of
government surveillance and oppression in China form our view against
highly invasive state surveillance. Yet media coverage of criminals
and terrorists using technology and encryption, particularly following
@@ -480,16 +484,19 @@ such a regime already exist and there is a widespread sentiment of
resistance amongst the public and in governments and courts against
such invasive measures. Yet, even in a world of widespread encryption,
governments and law enforcement would demonstrably still be able to
-conduct surveillance and investigation at some level.
+conduct surveillance and investigation at some level. It is clear that
+in the Internet age, it is no longer as easy to disguise or hide the
+truth as it once was. Information has been shown extremely powerful in
+subverting totalitarianism {Nicholson Cold War broadcast} and due to the
+Internet regimes are less and less able to manipulate the truth. I
+feel that the most interesting developments in the near future will be
+how the Chinese government and people will react to developments
.nr HY 0
.ad l
IME/Pluton -- backdoors
https://www.techrepublic.com/article/is-the-intel-management-engine-a-backdoor/
https://www.techrepublic.com/article/why-the-nsa-may-not-need-backdoors/
- Disabled on new ThinkPads: https://www.theregister.com/2022/01/20/microsoft_amd_pluton_lenovo/
-
-Heatbleed (2014) (occured in open source software)
Government
https://rules.house.gov/bill/117/hr-4521 .
@@ -508,5 +515,7 @@ https://ooni.org/post/2021-russia-blocks-tor/ .
https://www.openrightsgroup.org/
-TODO : recite bulletin
-https://www.ghi-dc.org/publication/stasi-at-home-and-abroad-domestic-order-and-foreign-intelligence .
+Todo:
+ program -> programme
+ SIGINT -> Sigint ?
+
diff --git a/refer b/refer
index 207199d..0364482 100644
--- a/refer
+++ b/refer
@@ -74,12 +74,14 @@
%D 2014
%J Bulletin of the German Historical Institute
%C German Historical Institute Washington DC
+%O https://www.ghi-dc.org/publication/stasi-at-home-and-abroad-domestic-order-and-foreign-intelligence .
%T Participatory Repression? Reflections on Popular Involvement with the Stasi
%A Gary Bruce
%D 2014
%J Bulletin of the German Historical Institute
%C German Historical Institute Washington DC
+%O https://www.ghi-dc.org/publication/stasi-at-home-and-abroad-domestic-order-and-foreign-intelligence .
%T N.S.A. Able to Foil Basic Safeguards of Privacy on Web
%J The New York Times
@@ -327,3 +329,23 @@
%D 2019
%O DOI: 10.1109/SP.2019.00002
+%T GCHQ taps fibre-optic cables for secret access to world's communications
+%J The Guardian
+%D June 2013
+%A Ewen MacAskill
+%A Julian Borger
+%A Nick Hopkins
+%A Nick Davies
+%A James Ball
+%O Accessed online on 2 April 2022
+
+%T The Cold War Broadcast That Gave East German Dissidents A Voice
+%J NPR
+%D November 2014
+%A Esme Nicholson
+%O Accessed online on 2 April 2022
+
+%A The^Federal^Archives
+%T About the Stasi Records Archive
+%D n.d.
+%O https://www.stasi-unterlagen-archiv.de/en/archives/about-the-archives/ Accessed 2 April 2022