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authorroot <root@turin.home>2022-03-29 23:33:26 +0100
committerroot <root@turin.home>2022-03-29 23:33:26 +0100
commit4140b7394df86d4225ecb065df1d6e38978c821d (patch)
tree0f3a79964ccd4e651714c1fbb665e2fe61bd031a
parent3c2c87334b335378ec0f10e0888e6f4b1e79c1df (diff)
Proofreading
-rwxr-xr-xmake1
-rw-r--r--paper.ms48
2 files changed, 36 insertions, 13 deletions
diff --git a/make b/make
index 57a5027..f123477 100755
--- a/make
+++ b/make
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ cat paper.ms|\
tr "^" " " |\
sed "s/^ //" |\
perl -0pe 's/\nREMOVEME//g' |
+ perl -0pe 's/\n\n\n/\n\n/g' |
cat macros - > target/temp
cat formatting.ms target/temp |\
groff -Eket -Tpdf -ms -P-pa4 > target/paper.pdf
diff --git a/paper.ms b/paper.ms
index 305f961..60b9758 100644
--- a/paper.ms
+++ b/paper.ms
@@ -166,7 +166,7 @@ internationally. Just as media piracy through torrents and access to
hidden services over Tor are able to evade regulation, regulation of
encryption may prove impossible. An arguably useful tool to the
authorities does exist in the hardware and infrastructure that users
-of the internet rely on. In the West a small number of companies (such
+of the Internet rely on. In the West a small number of companies (such
as Intel, Nvidia, Arm and Apple) design and produce the majority of
hardware in a proprietary and closed source manner.
@@ -217,15 +217,16 @@ The company and laptop gained significant media coverage
(cite) showing an interest from the public in open hardware. An
argument can be made that such projects are for niche interest groups
only, and that such solutions will never see the commercial success
-seen by the larger, non-open manufacturers such as Intel and ARM,
-however clear adoption of standards such as RISC-V by large
-institutions (cite) as well as the clear interest the public have
-demonstrated in commercially available open solutions (research, cite)
-demonstrate quite the opposite: that open hardware will continue to
+seen by the larger, non-open manufacturers such as Intel and ARM.
+However, the clear adoption of standards such as RISC-V by large
+institutions demonstrates quite the opposite:
+that open hardware will continue to
become increasingly prevalent and that currently popular hardware with
-its susceptibility to surveillance will possibly start to disappear.
-.PP
-A shift toward open standards reveals a problem for law enforcement
+its susceptibility to surveillance will possibly have a reduced
+presence in the future.
+
+Movement towards open standards in both hardware and software
+reveals a problem for law enforcement
agencies and counterterrorism forces. The tools of mass surveillance
that once enabled investigation into crime or terror such as reading
messages/emails, listening to calls, tracking location, or analysing
@@ -236,11 +237,11 @@ It is clear that knowledge such as the 2013 Snowden leaks had an impact
on the public (cite), and people are therby more interested in
their privacy and preventing surveillance. Around the world
individuals use tools to increase their privacy and anonymity when
-using the internet, as well as to overcome censorship of information
+using the Internet, as well as to overcome censorship of information
by governments. A major exception to the availability of the free
Internet has been
China, where the government has unparalleled control over the
-flow of information over the internet. This has allowed the filtering
+flow of information over the Internet. This has allowed the filtering
of content, prevention from accessing sites, and the blocking of the
anonymity network Tor which would allow users to circumvent measures
put in place by the government {firewall}{talbot tor china}{winter
@@ -254,13 +255,34 @@ citizens. Any such measures, however, will face scrutiny from the
media and public in Western society and thereby open software such as
Tor is used to share significant amounts of information away from the
observation of law enforcement, allowing illegal activity to occur
-{gulati}.
+{gulati}. The reduced ability for law enforcement to investigate crime
+will clearly have an impact by allowing criminals to act with
+additional impunity. In particular, the sharing child sexual abuse
+material, trafficking and other such crimes that are enabled by the
+Internet present reason for concern.
+
+It is however clear that the methods available to law enforcement are
+not all exhausted due to technological change. Social engineering
+methods; communications traffic analysis such as phone records;
+metadata analysis from the underlying infrastructure of the Internet,
+including public blockchains and Internet Service Provider data; and
+traditional methods such as searching for contraband goods are all
+available to law enforcement despite measures used by criminals or
+terrorists such as encryption. Indeed, one could argue that the
+limitations on law enforcement investigations due to technology have a
+limited impact on the efficacy of investigation, as other sources of
+evidence have been effectively explored when encryption has been used,
+particularly in the prevention of terror {Graham}. Thus, encryption
+might only have a limited impact on law enforcement investigations
+whilst having a serious impact on user privacy. Although encryption
+can prevent some investigation the compromise is arguably acceptable
+due to the net benefit encryption offers to society.
In addition, the rate of development in unconventional computing
methods is increasing rapidly. Effective quantum computing will
result in existing popular cryptographic algorithms such as RSA, which
is used for communications and digital signatures, no longer being
-secure {lily chen quantum}.
+secure {Lily Chen quantum}.
Significant research such as at IBM in recent years (cite) has shown
feasibility in current ideas surrounding quantum computing and
promising results in development towards quantum supremacy and in the