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diff --git a/papers/1.tex b/papers/1.tex new file mode 100644 index 0000000..1b67cc3 --- /dev/null +++ b/papers/1.tex @@ -0,0 +1,652 @@ + +\chapter{Selfish Comparative Optimism: A Rejoinder to Nagasawa's \emph{Problem of Evil for Atheists}} +\chaptermark{Selfish Comparative Optimism} +\chapterauthor{Wilson Sugeng, +\textit{University of St Andrews}} + + +% Makes the section headings be formatted so it does `Section 1:', instead of just '1' +\renewcommand*{\thesection}{Section~\arabic{section}:} +% \thesubsection might use \thesection, therefore it is also redefined +\renewcommand*{\thesubsection}{\arabic{section}.\arabic{subsection}} + + +\begin{quote} +Yujin Nagasawa's problem of systemic evil (POSE) argues that systemic +evils like natural selection pose a greater challenge to +atheism/non-theism than to theism, as they conflict with ``modest +optimism'': the view that the world is fundamentally ``not bad.'' +Nagasawa suggests theism resolves this by appealing to a heavenly bliss, +offsetting natural evils, a strategy unavailable to +atheists/non-theists. However, I argue that atheists/non-theists are +better equipped to address POSE because they are not constrained by the +theistic commitment to a categorically good world. + +In Section $1$, I critique two theistic approaches to POSE. Extreme +optimism defends the actual world as the best possible one, requiring +problematic justifications such as free-will and ``only-way'' theodicies +to explain systemic evils as necessary. Neutral optimism, while allowing +for multiple good worlds, still struggles to reconcile systemic evils +with a benevolent God, merely shifting the problem to other possible +worlds. + +In Section $2$, I explore how atheists/non-theists can bypass POSE. They +can adopt personal, rather than cosmic, optimism, valuing their own +existence without affirming the world's overall goodness. Alternatively, +they can embrace comparative optimism, viewing existence as better than +non-existence without attributing intrinsic value to natural processes +like evolution. These flexible approaches free non-theists from the +philosophical burdens tied to systemic evils. + +In Section $3$, I argue that even if POSE persists, atheists/non-theists +can ``borrow'' theists' theodicies without committing to their +metaphysical assumptions. By adopting naturalistic or subjective +frameworks, non-theists can justify their modest optimism without the +theological constraints imposed by theism. This demonstrates that POSE +ultimately challenges theistic frameworks more than atheistic ones. +\end{quote} + +\vspace{\credgap} + +\section*{Introduction} + +In \emph{The Problem of Evil for Atheists,} Yujin Nagasawa develops a +problem of systemic evil (POSE) that he claims challenges both +atheists/non-theists and theists alike.\footnote{When I say, ``God'' and + ``Theism'' in this paper, I assume an omniscient, omnipotent, and + omnibenevolent singular/simple creator.} He identifies a tension +between two widely held theses: + +\begin{enumerate}[leftmargin=42] +\def\labelenumi{(\arabic{enumi})} +\item + Systemic evil: The process of natural selection necessitates + significant suffering and pain for countless sentient animals. +\item + Modest optimism: Overall and fundamentally, the environment in which + we exist is not bad.\footnote{Yujin Nagasawa, \emph{The Problem of + Evil for Atheists} (Oxford University Press, 2024), 133, 140.} +\end{enumerate} + +\noindent While theists naturally affirm modest optimism due to their belief in a +benevolent creator God, Nagasawa observes that atheists/non-theists are +also generally grateful for their existence.\footnote{Nagasawa, + \emph{The Problem of Evil for Atheists}, 161.} For instance, popular +atheist Richard Dawkins suggests that contemplation of the law-like +evolutionary processes behind our existence puts us ``in a position to +give thanks for our luck in being here''---not a gratitude directed +towards any agent or being, but rather a ``gratitude in a +vacuum.''\footnote{Richard Dawkins, ``The Greatest Show on Earth + Live'' (lecture, University of Auckland, Auckland, New Zealand, 13 + March 2010).} Nagasawa sees this as inconsistent: expressing +existential gratitude without acknowledging the systemic evils +underpinning it implies a tacit endorsement of these evils. + +To illustrate this tension, Nagasawa adapts Janna Thompson's apology +paradox, which holds that regretting an unjust historical event can be +problematic if one's existence depends on that event. For example, a Jew +whose grandparents met during the Holocaust faces a paradox: to regret +the Holocaust may seem to imply regretting her own existence.\footnote{Janna + Thompson, ``The Apology Paradox,'' \emph{The Philosophical Quarterly} + 50\emph{,} No. 201 (2000): 471.} Thompson resolves this by +distinguishing between regretting \emph{how} one came to exist and +\emph{that} one exists---the Jew can regret \emph{how} her grandparents +met, without regretting \emph{that} they met at all.\footnote{Janna + Thompson, ``The Apology Paradox,'' \emph{The Philosophical Quarterly} + 50\emph{,} No. 201 (2000): 475.} Applied to POSE, this seems to suggest that one can regret the +mechanisms of natural selection without regretting the outcome of our +existence. + +However, Nagasawa argues that this resolution fails in the context of +POSE. Unlike historical events, natural selection is not a contingent +circumstance but a fundamental feature of the natural world.\footnote{Nagasawa, + \emph{The Problem of Evil for Atheists}, 167.} To reject it is not to +regret a particular pathway to existence, but to undermine the very +conditions that make existence possible. That is, there is no possible +world where natural selection does not govern nature and beings like us +still exist. + +Theists, Nagasawa argues, are better positioned to defend modest +optimism, drawing on ``heavenly bliss'' theodicies that justify or +outweigh earthly suffering with the promise of an afterlife. These come +in two forms: (1) as a deferred justification, where evolution is +acceptable because it leads to eternal reward, and (2) as a utilitarian +offset, where infinite heavenly bliss outweighs finite worldly +suffering. Because atheists cannot appeal to such concepts, POSE, he +claims, presents a more serious problem for atheists. + +Contrary to Nagasawa, I argue that atheists and non-theists are better +positioned to address POSE because they are not constrained by the +theistic requirement to see the world as overall categorically good. To +support this claim, I first critique two theistic attempts at resolving +systemic evil, namely extreme and neutral optimism, illustrating their +shortcomings. Subsequently, I explore how atheists/non-theists might +effectively sidestep POSE by adopting personal rather than cosmic +optimism, or by embracing a comparative optimism which sees existence as +preferable to non-existence without categorically endorsing the systems +that facilitated it. Finally, I turn Nagasawa's borrowing argument +around to propose that, even if POSE remains challenging, +atheists/non-theists can strategically adopt theistic theodicies without +their accompanying metaphysical assumptions, thereby reducing POSE's +impact and revealing it to be ultimately a greater challenge for +theistic frameworks than for atheistic or non-theistic ones. + +\section{Two Theist Modest Optimists} +\subsection{Extreme optimism} + +The first theist modest optimists---extreme optimists---claim that +because God actualised the best among all possible worlds, systemic evil +must necessarily exist in all good worlds. Although Gottfried Wilhelm +Leibniz does not himself discuss systemic evil and predates evolution, +his \emph{Theodicy} (1710) presents a system where given God's +omnibenevolence and omniscience---if a possible world is better than the +actual, then God would either not be good enough to desire the best for +the world, or ignorant in not knowing which world is the +best.\footnote{G. W. Leibniz, \emph{Theodicy,} edited by Austin Farrer, + translated by E. M. Huggard (Open Court Publishing Company, 1985), + 249.} + +As an implication, extreme optimists must affirm Nagasawa's claim that +no possible world exists in which natural selection does not govern +nature; for if God is necessary, then no other world is possible. +Natural selection must therefore serve an instrumental role in the +world's goodness. Building on this system, Austin Farrer argues that the +removal of any such purported evil systems will undermine God's +mechanism for bringing about the best world. The goodness of a physical +system, for instance, inherently includes the potential for mutual +interference, leading to evils like predation. Without this +interference---if this world were a ``magically self-arranged garden'' +free of competition for space or resources---physicality itself ceases +to exist.\footnote{Austin Farrer, \emph{Love Almighty and Ills + Unlimited} (Collins, 1962), 53-54.} Removing such systems would +be akin to relieving an animal's pain ``by the removal of its nervous +system; that is to say, of its animality.''\footnote{Austin Farrer, \emph{Love Almighty and Ills Unlimited} (Collins, 1962), 51.} +Regretting natural selection thus implicitly challenges God's +rationality and goodness in creating us as physical beings rather than +spiritual entities.\footnote{Austin Farrer, \emph{Love Almighty and Ills + Unlimited} (Collins, 1962), 67.} + +An immediate difficulty with extreme optimism is that claiming this +world to be the best possible one is hard to reconcile with the presence +of seemingly avoidable evils observed throughout nature. This tension is +captured ironically in the eponymous character of Voltaire's +\emph{Candide} (1759) who insists that this is the best possible world +as he faces a world plagued with wars, earthquakes, and +slavery.\footnote{Nagasawa, \emph{The Problem of Evil for Atheists,} + 129.} Or when Darwin questions why God permitted the creation of the +Ichneumonidae who brutally feeds inside the living bodies of +caterpillars.\footnote{Charles Darwin, ``22 May 1860 Letter to Asa + Gray,'' Darwin Correspondence Project, accessed on 5 December 2024, + https://www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/DCP-LETT-2814.xml.} This +presents a major challenge: extreme optimism struggles to align with +observable, avoidable evils unless it denies these empirical +observations---as some Creationists do---or reinterprets such systemic +evils as necessary.\footnote{Paul Prescott, ``The Secular Problem of + Evil: An Essay in Analytic Existentialism,'' \emph{Religious Studies} + 57 (2021): 102.} + +Granting natural selection's empirical truth, theists generally present +two kinds of theodicies for \emph{why} God actualised natural selection. +Firstly, theists have adapted the free-will theodicy to address some +non-agential non-human suffering. In traditional free-will theodicies, +God permits agents the capacity to choose evil over good as the goodness +of human agency outweighs the risks of their choosing evil. In one +adaptation, Richard Swinburne argues that animal pain and suffering +exists as examples of evil actions humans can inflict on each other. +Predation therefore exists as an educational tool for humans to observe +and understand how to commit evil, thereby enabling their capacity for +moral choice.\footnote{Richard Swinburne, ``Natural Evil,'' + \emph{American Philosophical Quarterly} 15\emph{,} No. 4 (1978): 299.} + +Secondly, theists have adapted a variation of the soul-making theodicy +known as the ``only-way'' theodicy, arguing that certain natural goods +can only develop through natural selection. Holmes Rolston observes that +the predator-prey cycle is instrumental to the beautiful diversity of +animals, where ``The cougar's fang has carved the limbs of the +fleet-footed deer, and vice versa.''\footnote{Holmes Rolston III, + \emph{Science and Religion: A Critical Survey} (London: Templeton + Foundation press, 2006), 134.} While Young-Earth Creationism may have +created this diversity instantaneously, Christopher Southgate argues +that natural selection is the only way creatures can develop into +biological ``selves'' with their own interests and +behaviours.\footnote{Southgate, \emph{The Groaning of Creation}, 58.} +This offsets any evolutionary evils for it culminates into complex +``selves'' that conform to God's image.\footnote{Southgate, \emph{The Groaning of Creation}, 72.} This +``selving'' must come independently, for Peter van Inwagen argues that +an irregular world is a defect: God who constantly intervenes and +violates his own laws is either a irrational or evil.\footnote{Peter van + Inwagen, ``The Problem of Evil, the Problem of Air, and the Problem of + Silence,'' \emph{Philosophical Perspectives} 5 (1991): 143-45.} So, +common to both free-will and ``only-way'' theodicies is a notion that +some ultimate good offsets the evils of natural selection as an +instrument. + +However, these two theodicies only defer the problem of evil to another +system underlying the challenged system. For instance, free-will +theodicies must still address Pierre Bayle's objection: If God's +omniscience foresees that giving humanity free will inevitably results +in unrighteousness, then God is either reckless or cruel to ``gift'' +humanity agency, knowing it would lead to their harm and judgment under +his wrath.\footnote{Pierre Bayle, \emph{Historical and Critical + Dictionary: Selections,} translated by Richard H. Popkin and Craig + Brush (Hackett, 1991), 177.} Echoing Bayle, Robert John Russell +questions, ``Why did God choose to create \emph{this} universe with +\emph{these} laws of physics knowing that they would not only make +Darwinian evolution unavoidable, and with it the sweep of natural evil +in the biological realm?''.\footnote{Robert John Russell, ``Natural + Theodicy in an Evolutionary Context,'' in \emph{Cosmology: From Alpha + to Omega} (Fortress Press, 2008), 259.} It appears, then, that extreme +optimism is burdened with regressive manifestations of the problem of +evil. + +In sum, while extreme optimists attempt to reconcile systemic evil with +the claim that this is the best possible world through the use of +free-will and ``only-way'' theodicies, such strategies ultimately defer +rather than resolve the problem. Faced with empirical evidence of +seemingly gratuitous suffering, they must either deny these realities or +accept increasingly speculative theological explanations. While extreme +optimism may appeal to the heavenly bliss defence, it still does not +explain \emph{why} natural selection is the best possible means towards +that end without returning to this regress or begging the question. As +such, extreme optimism appears ill-equipped to resolve the tension +Nagasawa identifies between systemic evil and modest optimism. So, +theists must either concede that natural selection is not the best +necessary instrument in the best possible world, or following Bayle and +Russell accept the former's pessimism or latter's ``agnostic cosmic +theodicy'' in accepting that POSE cannot be answered.\footnote{Robert John Russell, ``Natural Theodicy in an Evolutionary Context,'' in \emph{Cosmology: From Alpha + to Omega} (Fortress Press, 2008), 255.} + + +\subsection{Neutral optimism} + + +The second theist modest optimists, the neutral optimists, reject that +the actual world is necessarily the best, but rather affirms that God +actualised one of many possible overall good worlds. For instance, +Robert Merrihew Adams argues that extreme optimism inappropriately +imposes a utilitarian standard of moral goodness to God's +omnibenevolence. Instead, he argues that traditional Judeo-Christian +ethics account for God's goodness in terms of his grace---an inclination +to love that is not based on the merit of the one being +loved.\footnote{Robert Merrihew Adams, ``Must God Create the Best?'', + \emph{Philosophical Review} 81 (1972): 324.} Indeed, core to Abrahamic +monotheism is an affirmation of God's aseity, his self-sufficiency and +independence from any external cause or necessity. \footnote{Ian A. + McFarland, \emph{From Nothing: A Theology of Creation} (Westminster + John Knox Press, 2014), 61.} If God were obligated to create the best +possible world in order to express his power or love, then his +omnipotence and omnibenevolence would become contingent on something +external---namely, the existence of that world---thereby undermining his +aseity. It follows, therefore, that a being who never exists is not +wronged by not being created, since existence itself is not owed to any +potential being.\footnote{Adams, ``Must God Create the Best? 319-20.} +Furthermore, beings in the actual but not best world have no right to +complain, lest they express an unmerited claim for special treatment or +violate modest optimism.\footnote{Adams, ``Must God Create the Best? 319-20.} God's omnibenevolence, +therefore, does not demand that he create the best world possible. + +As an implication, neutral optimists can entertain that there is a +possible world without natural selection where we exist. However, two +considerations may constrain this possibility. Firstly, this possible +world must be logically coherent. Thomas Morris argues that if God's +omnipotence is committed to what is logically and semantically possible, +God becomes a ``delimiter of possibilities.''\footnote{Thomas V. Morris, + ``The Necessity of God's Goodness,'' \emph{New Scholasticism} 59 + (1985): 425.} That is, as God's existence is necessary in all possible +worlds, those worlds must reflect his omnipotence by being logically +coherent and his omnibenevolence by being overall good. This means that +if a world without natural selection either fails to be logically +coherent or cannot sustain overall goodness without introducing other +systemic evils, it may not be a genuine possibility after all. Secondly, +this limitation implies that a possible world without natural selection +where we exist is not necessarily better or worse than the actual world. +It could very well be that following the ``only-way'' theodicies, the +goodness of true biological selves must necessarily come through natural +selection and that this outweighs the evil of natural selection. +Regardless, the neutral optimist is distinct in that they can be +grateful for their existence without necessarily implying that natural +selection is instrumentally good. + +One obvious challenge against neutral optimism is its shifting +definition of God's omnibenevolence may not be intuitively satisfying. +For instance, Adams's definition of God's ``grace'', which does not +require universal benevolence to all creatures, may only be satisfactory +to some Calvinists or those within certain theological traditions. While +this conception asserts that natural selection does not need to be +justified as instrumentally good, the reality and impact of systemic +evil make it difficult for suffering beings to reconcile that God's +omnibenevolence does not require him to show grace to them, in tension +with their own intuitions about what it means to be loving. However, as +this critique may hold less weight for those aligned with certain +Calvinist doctrines, where such a conception of grace is more readily +accepted, it will be set aside as a doctrinal matter. + +A more universal challenge is that even if a neutral optimist can +maintain modest optimism about their existence while affirming systemic +evil through yearning for another possible world, logical constraints on +such worlds mean that regretting the evils of the actual world may +require relinquishing goods unique to its constitution. For example, +recalling Swinburne's free-will theodicy, a possible world without +natural selection might lead to it not having human agency. Similarly, +recalling Southgate's ``only-way'' theodicy, a world without natural +selection could lack independent selves. If the existence of goods like +human agency or autonomous selves carry significant moral weight, then +removing the conditions that produce them (i.e., natural selection) may +render the alternative world no longer overall good---and thus not +genuinely possible. At best, such possible worlds without natural +selection might not involve a loss of goods significant enough to +undermine modest optimism. At worst, the trade-offs could introduce +greater problems of evil. A creationist world, for instance, implies +that God played a direct role in designing cruel beings like the +Ichneumonidae than if they developed independently through evolution. + +Comparing extreme and neutral theistic optimism, both conceptions of +modest optimism requires that the world is overall good. This is because +evidence of systemic evils must be outweighed by some other goodness or +burdened with a theodicy. This, however, is not a requirement for +atheist/non-theist optimism. + +\section{Two atheist/non-theist modest optimists} +\subsection{Personal optimism} + +The first atheist/non-theist modest optimist approach argues that the +scope of existential gratitude can be limited to the personal level +without axiologically considering the world as an aggregate. While +Dawkins expresses his gratitude for existing despite unfavourable odds, +he regrets that, ``Nature is red in tooth and claw. But I don't want to +live in that kind of a world. I want to change the world in which I live +in such a way that natural selection no longer applies.''\footnote{Frank + Miele, ``Darwin's Dangerous Disciple: An Interview with Richard + Dawkins,'' \emph{The Skeptic}, 27 October 2010, + \url{https://www.skeptic.com/eskeptic/10-10-27/}.} However, we can +resolve Dawkins' apparent disjunct by affirming \emph{personal} +existential optimism directed at one's own existence while rejecting +\emph{cosmic} existential optimism that the world is overall good. This +is not methodologically novel; Asha Lancaster-Thomas observes that even +within individuals' lifetimes, we are grateful for some parts of our +lives, but not parts characterised by pain and suffering such as a +painful chronic illness.\footnote{Asha Lancaster-Thomas, ``Can Heaven + Justify Horrendous Moral Evils? A Postmortem Autopsy,'' + \emph{Religions} 14, No. 296 (2023): 6.} + +An implication of personal, but not cosmic, optimism is that their +existential gratitude does not need to consider the axiology of natural +selection. One could remain axiologically agnostic towards the +instruments of their existence, while valuing the goodness of their +personal existence. Guy Kahane emphasises this distinction by arguing +that even if natural selection is a causally fundamental instrument to +our existence, it is axiologically irrelevant as instrumental value +alone does not add any overall value to the world.\footnote{Guy Kahane, + ``Optimism without theism? Nagasawa on Atheism, Evolution, and Evil,'' + \emph{Religious Studies} 58 (2022): 706.} Under this conception, one +could even be cosmically pessimistic but still be optimistic about their +personal life as they experience it. Modest optimism is thus +reinterpreted to affirm attitudinal optimism, that we are grateful to +exist in this world; but not axiological optimism, that the world is +overall good.\footnote{Guy Kahane, ``Optimism without theism? Nagasawa on Atheism, Evolution, and Evil,'' \emph{Religious Studies} 58 (2022): 702.} + +However, after disregarding pessimism, personal optimism appears +empirically challenged as most personal optimists are often implicitly +also cosmic optimists. Responding to Kahane, Nagasawa grants that +personal optimism does not necessarily entail cosmic optimism. However, +he argues that this reformulation of modest optimism changes the target +of POSE, which defines modest optimism as affirming both attitudinal and +axiological optimism.\footnote{Nagasawa, \emph{The Problem of Evil for + Atheists,} 184.} For he argues that rational personal optimists who +procreate implicitly believe that the world they are bringing their +child into is overall a good place.\footnote{Nagasawa, \emph{The Problem of Evil for + Atheists,} 184.} The personal, but +not cosmic, reformulation of modest optimism, therefore, seemingly +misses the original target of POSE and is only applicable to a minority +of anti-natalist pessimists like David Benatar. + +Responding to this, Nagasawa's formulation of modest optimism is already +limited to the scope of``the environment in which we exist.'' The +specific environment of individual experiences does not necessarily +include the predation experienced by other preyed beings. Indeed, this +does not preclude the modest optimist from being selfish for bringing a +child into the world. Or disregarding the pains of the world, a +personally optimistic individual can choose to be ignorant of the +world's plights by never contributing to charitable causes to use the +money to instead maximise personal pleasures. It is not evident, +therefore, that most personal optimists must also be cosmic optimists. + +\subsection{Comparative optimism} + +The second atheist/non-theist modest optimist approach argues that +modest optimism only views the world as \emph{comparatively} good, but +not necessarily \emph{categorically} good. That is, the world must only +be \emph{comparatively} better than non-existence, rather than +positively good. This distinction is significant, as Nagasawa's +comparative argument for theism seems to present the axiology of the +world in binary categorical terms. Theism's appeal to a heavenly bliss +allows for a world with more goodness rather than evil.\footnote{Nagasawa, \emph{The Problem of Evil for Atheists,} 171.} But because atheists/non-theists are not committed to affirming +an omnibenevolent God, Kahane argues that they are not obliged to claim +that their existence is categorically good, or that the world contains +more goodness than evil. Indeed, even under Leibniz's extreme optimism, +the world is not necessarily categorically good, just that it is +comparatively the best of all possible worlds.\footnote{Kahane, + ``Optimism Without Theism,'' 713.} + +An implication of a comparatively better, but not categorically good, +optimism is that natural selection does not have to be categorically +good. Assuming that existence in itself is a good greater than all kinds +of non-existence, an actual world with systemic evil is better than any +unactualised world. So, modest optimism's ``not bad'' is equated to +being comparatively better than non-existence. Opposing theism's appeal +to the supernatural, this essentially lowers the requirement for modest +optimism. + +One major challenge is that this comparative-goodness version of modest +optimism closely borders on pessimism, and therefore demands an account +of why existence, despite systemic evils, is fundamentally and overall +better than non-existence. The pessimist Benatar, for instance, argues +that the absence of pain is always good, even if no one benefits, +whereas the absence of pleasure is only bad if someone is deprived by +it. This asymmetry supports his claim that existence, with its +inevitable suffering, may be worse than non-existence, which guarantees +goodness with no badness.\footnote{David Benatar, \emph{Better Never to + Have Been: The Harm of Coming into Existence} (Oxford University + Press, 2006), 30.} + +Responding to Benatar, the optimist can follow Thaddeus Metz's argument +against Benatar's claim that the absence of pain is good, describing the +absence of pain as \emph{not bad} rather than \emph{good.}\footnote{Thaddeus + Metz, ``Are Lives Worth Creating?'', \emph{Philosophical Papers} 40, + No. 2 (2011): 241-45} Otherwise, the atheist/non-theist modest +optimist can simply appeal to the previously-discussed personal, rather +than cosmic, optimism. All modest optimism demands is that according to +myself, it is better for me to exist than for me not to exist. Indeed, +Benetar seems to grant this notion, as he distinguishes a present-tense +``life worth continuing'' and future-tense ``life worth +starting.''\footnote{Benatar, \emph{Better Never to Have Been,} 22-23.} +Personal optimists often experience instances where the goods of +actualised pleasure outweigh the evils of pain, resulting in a net +utility that makes existence preferable to non-existence. So, unless one +is personally pessimistic, there is nothing paradoxical about claiming +one's personal life is better to exist than not exist. + +Combining these two approaches, the atheist/non-theist, can commit to a +personal and comparative form of modest optimism that still accounts for +the categorically systemic evil of the cosmos. Unlike theistic extreme +optimism's commitment to the instrumental value of natural selection as +a part of God's providence, personal optimists can simply remain +agnostic about natural systems' axiological value. But while theistic +neutral optimists can adopt a similar approach to the +atheism/non-theism's comparative (not categorical) goodness, they remain +committed to both that possible worlds must overall be good, and that +God's creative ability is bound to logical laws, so that the possible +worlds they yearn for must necessarily contain some other kind of +systemic evil that requires a theodicy . The personal optimist on the +other hand need not make this consideration of the overall goodness of +other possible worlds. So, whilst theism can appeal to the heavenly +bliss, the non-theist can simply bypass POSE without needing to address +it. + +\section{Borrowing Theism's Optimism Without its Metaphysics} + +But even if atheists/non-theists remain burdened by POSE due to perhaps +their cosmic or even categorical optimism, I propose that they can +``borrow'' the theodicies used by theists to justify their modest +optimism. This reverses Nagasawa's theistic strategy, which claims that +theism's supernaturalist ontology (encompassing both natural and +supernatural realms) subsumes the atheist/non-theist's naturalist +ontology (limited to the natural world), thus allowing theists to +``borrow'' atheist/non-theist responses to POSE.\footnote{Nagasawa, + \emph{The Problem of Evil for Atheists,} 173.} However, Nagasawa does +not address the fact that supernaturalist ontologies bring additional +axiological presuppositions---namely, that an omnibenevolent God exists +and that his creation must necessarily be overall and categorically +good. Non-theists, by contrast, can adopt the theist's belief that the +world is overall good using the theist's rationalisations, without +committing to these broader metaphysical claims about God. In essence, +atheists/non-theists can justify their optimism in the face of POSE +without having to commit to the theist's wider ontological framework. + +Borrowing from extreme theistic optimism, the atheist/non-theist can +still view natural selection as categorically good by appealing to the +same free-will and ``only-way'' theodicies---without relying on +theological assumptions. For instance, they may regard natural selection +as instrumentally necessary for the emergence of goods like human +free-will or biological selves and affirm these outcomes as +categorically valuable in themselves. There is nothing inherently +theological in valuing such features of natural history. While theists +might argue that moral value requires an objective grounding in God, the +atheist can respond in two ways: either by offering a naturalistic +foundation for moral value, or by treating such value judgements---and +the modest optimism they support---as subjective, grounded in personal +or shared human perspectives. On this view, modest optimism need not +depend on the objective truth of its content but rather functions as an +attitudinal stance. Accordingly, theist theodicies can be borrowed by +non-theists as explanatory tools, enabling them to affirm the world's +overall goodness without committing to metaphysical claims that theists +traditionally used to justify them. + +Borrowing from neutral theistic optimism, the atheist/non-theist can +still affirm that the actual world is not necessarily the best possible +world, but still trust that it is better to exist than not to exist. The +lack of a requirement for atheists/non-theists to commit to the idea +that the world is categorically good allows for a more flexible +position. Even if systemic evils suggest that the world is not +fundamentally good, the personal optimist can still maintain a stance of +cosmic neutrality. They can accept the world as it is---flawed, but not +necessarily bad in a way that undermines their gratitude for existing. +Indeed, without a commitment to an omnibenevolent God who governs over +all creation's actions, the non-theist can simply adopt a position of +gratitude for the outcomes of those processes without ascribing moral or +intrinsic value to these violent/harsh (but not immoral) systemic +processes themselves. + +This strategic borrowing highlights a key asymmetry: while theists must +reconcile systemic evil with a metaphysical commitment to a +categorically good creation, non-theists can adopt similar explanatory +frameworks without such constraints. In doing so, they preserve the +practical benefits of modest optimism without incurring the theological +debts that weigh down the theistic response to POSE. + +\section*{Conclusion} + +POSE, therefore, remains a problem only for theists as their conception +of modest theism must commit to the belief that a good God would create +a categorically good world. This commitment imposes significant burdens +ontheist extreme optimists, whose belief that the actual world is the +best possible world obliges them either to embrace pessimism, appeal to +mystery, or present a theodicy for systemic evils. And while responses +like the free-will and ``only-way'' theodicies may present \emph{prima +facie} defences to POSE, they only regress into deeper manifestations of +the problem of evil unless the theist begs the question or makes an +appeal to mystery. Likewise, theist neutral optimists, who holds that +the actual world is only one of many possible worlds that are not +necessarily the best ones, remain committed to asserting that world is +overall good---which is still difficult to reconcile with or even +amplifies the existence of systemic evils. + +In contrast, the atheist/non-theist can either borrow the +theist's theodicies, or maintain a personal comparative optimistic +stance that disregards POSE overall. By selfishly narrowing modest +optimism to the personal level, the atheist/non-theist can disregard +systemic evils while remaining grateful for their own lives as they +experience it. Furthermore, their non-commitment to categorical goodness +allows them to value comparatively their personal lives as better than +non-existence, even if by borrowing neutral optimism, they accept the +world as it is and appreciate the outcomes of systemic processes like +natural selection without assigning moral or intrinsic value to them. + + +\newpage +\section*{Bibliography} + +\refsection + +\begin{hangparas}{\hangingindent}{1} +Adams, Robert Merrihew. ``Must God Create the Best?'' +\emph{Philosophical Review} 81 (1972): 317-332. + +Bayle, Pierre. \emph{Historical and Critical Dictionary: Selections.} +Translated by Richard H. Popkin and Craig Brush. Indianapolis, IN: +Hackett, 1991. + +Benatar, David. \emph{Better Never to Have Been: The Harm of Coming into +Existence}. Oxford University Press, 2006. + +Darwin, Charles. ``22 May 1860 Letter to Asa Gray.'' Darwin +Correspondence Project. 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