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diff --git a/paper.ms b/paper.ms deleted file mode 100644 index e47f3d9..0000000 --- a/paper.ms +++ /dev/null @@ -1,227 +0,0 @@ -.R1 -short-label D.y -sort spec -.R2 -.TL -Title -.AU -Mohit Agarwal -.AI -February 2022 -.LP -A problem (instability), a solution - -is this a fair question to argue - -What does the future hold for encryption? - -topic sentences? - -Ars technica: seek alternate source - -Symbol, slogan, surprise, salient (sticks out), story - -The Internet offers an arguably Utopian communication method. The -nature of computers and the information stored on them means that data -such as a book or film can be duplicated practically instantly. When -sharing information on the Internet, the physical limitations of -traditional methods do not apply. To give someone a book is either to -lose the copy yourself or to obtain or to produce another physical -copy of that book. With the Internet, however, information can exist -in a more absolute state, separated entirely from any physical media. -Millions of people can download a single book as easily as one person -could, and the traditional limitations that lead us to 'own' -individual property no longer exist. In this way, the Internet -eliminates the ownership of information in whatever forms it -perpetuated through the attachment of information to media such as -books or celluloid film, and the copying of information can take place -in its purest state: of literal information, and then being stored as -pure information, although on a physical media such as a hard drive, -for all meaningful reasons (due to the large capacities and low cost -of modern drives) unattached to anything physical whatsoever. Although -this was true for other methods of sharing information, such as -through radio broadcasts, information received via the Internet can be -easily stored, processed, and accessed at any time, as well as giving -anyone the ability to broadcast their own information rather than -receive it, as usage of broadcasting towers was and remains limited, -whereas the internet may be used to present new information by anyone. -A key example of this might be Wikipedia. Wikipedia allows individuals -to contribute to entries that form a vast encyclopedia. - -The way we respond to encryption as a society will clearly be -significant, and the success of government responses to encryption in -relation to issues such as terror and crime are rather significant. A -failure of effective response could allow terrorism to occur in ways -previously unseen, however an overreaction threatens people's civil -liberties and could easily be exploited for reasons other than -prevention of crime and terror. The successes and failures of -government responses can be judged in various ways. - -.IP i. 5 -Have responses stopped a significant amount of crime -.IP ii. 5 -Have responses stopped a significant amount of terror -.IP iii. 5 -Are these responses open to exploitation -.IP iv. 5 -Are these responses to extreme -.PP - -An argument is often made against digital privacy in the interest of -national security. With access to communications and usage history law -enforcement and government can quickly discover large amounts of -information useful in a criminal investigation or in preventing -criminal activity. Graham{#CTC terrorists} explores the use of -encryption by terrorists which is often cited in a reason for giving -governments access to unencrypted Internet communications so that -suspicious activity can be flagged and investigated in order to -prevent a terror attack or in order to better respond in the case of -an attack. Graham describes the extensive use of end to end encryption -used by terrorists in order to avoid interception by the authorities. -Due to US usage of intercepted communications to uncover and prevent a -number of al-Qa'ida plots, the terrorist organisation and other -terrorist groups have increasingly used encrypted communications (read -citation from Graham). An significant factor is the use of -non-mainstreams software in early use of encryption by terrorists, -including a program that built a wrapper around the popular, secure, -and open source PGP called \fIMujahedeen secrets\fR. Although now -terrorists and criminals use widely available, popular, and -user-friendly software such as the Tails operating system or Telegram -(Graham citation 28), terrorists organisations have shown an ability -to make use of more obscure and complicated systems, as well as use -publicly available source code in order to construct software for -operatives to use. - -Although the issue of popular messaging technologies and their support -for 'end-to-end encryption' is often discussed, the argument that the -introduction of end-to-end encryption by large companies such as -Facebook gives an advantage to criminals {conversation Facebook}{home -office} is arguably an entirely invalid one. By preventing the usage -of true end-to-end encryption in industry, we will not be able to -prevent those attempting to evade the law from doing so, as shown in -the case of terrorist organisations who have used more obscure -software in the past and also in the case of the abundance of illegal -activity that occurs on the so called dark web in the form of the -trade of drugs and child pornography among others (cite). Instead the -limitation of use of encryption on popular software will only decrease -the privacy of those uninterested in criminal activity and instead -using technology to communicate. In the case of platforms such as -Instagram (which is owned by Facebook) it is quite clear that the vast -majority of communications (cite) will not contain anything illegal -(reword) and that it is these conversations that will suffer from a -lack of encryption. The information exposed by Edward Snowden in 2013 -demonstrates that the US government has processed and collected vast -amounts of unencrypted data (cite) and likely continues to do so. In -the case of unencrypted messaging the problem remains and preventing -end to end encryption will simply allow governments to maintain the -status quo of being able to intercept and read all communications -between its citizens and individuals outside of their jurisdictions. - -In order to conduct the vast amounts of surveillance they did in the -GDR (German Democratic Republic) in support of the ruling party -{Jarausch}, the Stasi gathered information from a vast network of -informants who greatly outnumbered Stasi agents {Bruce 2014}. Whilst -in Nazi Germany there may have been around 1 Gestapo agent for every -2300 citizens, in the GDR it was closer to 1 informant or officer for -every 63 citizens. Those living in the GDR often had experiences -involving investigation by the Stasi and there was clearly an -understanding amongst citizens {funder} of the GDR that one had to be -wary of an informant or agent listening in. In modern western society -there is a similar collective understanding that governments -attempting to carry out surveillance on a massive scale on their own -citizens. A key distinction, however, is that in societies such as the -UK, this work is not carried out by a vast network of informants, -there are no gargantuan gargantuan stores of paper, and there are no -hundreds of miles of film (cite all) documenting and aiding the -surveillance of the authorities. Instead, there - -As with any technology, regulation has followed behind development in -an attempt to control its limits. Much as automotive regulation -followed the increase in popularity of cars in areas such as the UK -and US, regulation will no doubt follow the newfound popularity of -heavy encryption. There are however, difference in the case of -encryption when compared to cars. The rate of change with modern -technology is far greater. There are already discussions about quantum -computers and their potential to overcome current encryption methods. -In the case of encryption regulation will continuously struggle to -control encryption methods due in part to how quickly they change, but -perhaps moreso due to their decentralised nature, where a government -cannot prevent the existence of software that enables encryption which -is open source and reproducible internationally. Just as media privacy -through torrents and access to hidden services over tor are possible -without significant regulation, regulation of encryption may prove -impossible. An arguably useful tool to the authorities does exist in -the hardware and infrastructure that users of the internet rely on. -Firstly, the vast majority (cite) of users in the foreseeable future -will continue to use the highly popular CPUs designed by Intel. -Concerns have already been expressed {Intel Management} with regard to -the Intel Management Engine that exists on modern processors produced -by Intel. Should governments chose that backdoor access is essential, -then this presence in hardware around the world alongside an influence -over Intel (a US based company) to give access to governments may -provide them with the ability to access information directly from the -target's hardware rather than having to intercept information in -transit. This would go for other hardware vendors such as AMD or ARM -also. Whether or not companies such as Intel would open backdoors to -governments is up for debate, however we are aware that in the case of -the Intel Management there was potentially an ability for it to be -disabled by US government authorities such as the NSA, demonstrating a -level of leverage the US government potentially has over organisations -including but not limited to Intel {register kill switch}{intel me -bleepingcomputer}. -Regardless of the level of influence governments might or -might not hold over private corporations, the potential exists for -systems built into non-open hardware which most people, even those -using open software use, leaving them more open to exploitation from -either state or private actors. Furthermore, there is a visible -interest in increasing the presence of technologies on the hardware -level, including the aforementioned Intel Management Engine, the -Trusted Platform Module (cite), and recently Microsoft's Pluton (cite) -subsystem, which will be present on hardware sold in the future. This -variety of hardware within a single computer is a rather interesting -and potentially worrying development, particularly with the clear -influence and interest both the US and Chinese governments (cite -both) are respectively showing (the US and China are the two largest -chip manufacturers (cite, reword)). - -Is discussion on this useful? -Individuals around the world have clearly expressed interest in -matters of privacy and encryption (cite) and open source software -allows those with the technical skills to become involved in the -development of technology that enables strong encryption and avoids -state surveillance. Measures taken by governments to prevent this -development will doubtless be limited unless extreme actions such as -those seen in China are taken. Otherwise, development will continue to -occur in both free and non free societies in support of individual -freedoms. The assertion of `Linus' law` that "given enough eyeballs, -all bugs are shallow" (cite - CathBaz) creates a serious inability -for actors such as governments to engineer backdoors into software as -the NSA previously has (cite) or to prevent the development of -software altogether (find example). On the other hand, a significant -amount of the software and hardware - -The discussion of encryption and related technologies has arguably -limited impact. State actors such as the NSA will continue to act -against individual freedoms and attempt to find or introduce backdoors -in technology that is widely used as part of its actions purportedly -in the interest of `national security`. Although public reactions to -information such as the 2013 Edward Snowden releases have been very -strong, they have not had significant effects on legislature, the -funding received by the NSA, and quite possibly the level of -surveillance carried out by the NSA (cite all). Thus, from recent -history, discussions in public or private spheres are unlikely to -influence decisions made inside already secretive agencies where -governments are ready to except that sacrifices must be made for the -greater good. Of course, the issue arises when surveillance exists -that does not exist simply to protect a nation, but instead mass, -indiscriminate surveillance is carried out on citizens not suspected -of any criminal or terrorist activity such as the Optic Nerve -program in the United Kingdom (cite), however governments nonetheless -prove willing to fund the activities of surveillance agencies. -Furthermore, there are options available to authorities that are -regularly made use of. (Give example from Graham) - -{firewall} - -.nr HY 0 -.ad l |