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@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ .R1 short-label D.y -sort spec +sort .R2 .TL Cryptography, crime, terror, and surveillance @@ -9,33 +9,56 @@ Cryptography, crime, terror, and surveillance .AI February 2022 .LP -Encryption offers a level of security and confidence for communications -that has not previously been seen. This offers individuals with the -ability to communicate with each other in a way that is practically -immune from eavesdropping of any sort. Naturally, this does mean that -malicious actors such as criminals and terrorists be able to use -encryption in order to commit crimes or enable acts of terror. In +Modern encryption methods allow a level of privacy in communication +that has not before been seen: information that is encrypted cannot be +decrypted without the necessary keys, which in the case of RSA is +ensured by the large primes involved and the current intractability of +large prime factorisation. This allows for communication that is +practically guaranteed to be private: a relatively new phenomenon in +communications, seen with inventions such as the one-tme pad (cite) +which was cryptographically secure and used by the both the KGB and +NSA (cite), beyond the use of the Enigma and Lorentz machines by the +Nazis which were both of which were decrypted by cryptanalysis methods +during the Second World War. Today, secure cryptographic methods are +used not only by government backed agencies in preventing or +practising espionage, but by individual citizens who are interested in +their privacy, security, or are simply using a program that happens to +encrypt their communications. Naturally, current availability of +cryptography potentially allows for malicious actors such as criminals +or terrorists to use encryption in order to commit crimes or acts of +terror. +In response to the threats of encryption and communications technology generally, governments have often engaged in signals intelligence (SIGINT) such as phone line tapping. Modern SIGINT initiatives have become incredibly complex and sophisticated and have grown greatly as popular adoption of technology has grown. Part of government interest in SIGINT is a direct response to percieved threads, such as the -Patriot Act in the US which followed the 2001 terrorist attacks with -the objective of strengthening national security (cite). State -sponsored SIGINT programmes aim to respond to encryption and other -technological developments with the primary interest of overcoming it -in order to prevent terror and crime. These measures have, however, -had arguably limited efffectiveness and have violated the privacy of -individuals who are not suspected of being a threat to national -security. The way we respond to encryption as a society will clearly -be significant, and the success of government responses to encryption -in relation to issues such as terror and crime are rather significant. -A failure of effective response could allow terrorism to occur in ways -previously unseen, however an overreaction threatens people's civil -liberties and could easily be exploited for reasons other than -prevention of crime and terror. The successes and failures of -government responses can be judged in various ways. +PATRIOT Act in the US which followed the 2001 terrorist attacks with +the objective of strengthening national security (cite). Later, the +FISA Amendments Act of 2008 further increased increased the powers of +law enforcement to access information, such as allowing the Attorney +General and Director of National Intelligence to provide information +about individuals outside the United States {House bill FISA}. It was, +however, the PATRIOT Act and FISA Amendments Act that was the +justification for large scale surveillance including the records of +phone calls of customers of the Verizon network, including calls from +the US to other states as well as calls localised entirely within the +US {guardian greenwald verizon}{guardian NSA roberts}{times savage +2013}. State sponsored SIGINT programmes such as that in the US aims +to respond to encryption and other technological developments with the +primary interest of overcoming it in order to prevent terror and +crime. These measures have, however, had arguably limited +efffectiveness and have violated the privacy of individuals who are +not suspected of being a threat to national security. The way we +respond to encryption as a society will clearly be significant, and +the success of government responses to encryption in relation to +issues such as terror and crime are rather significant. A failure of +effective response could allow terrorism to occur in ways previously +unseen, however an overreaction threatens people's civil liberties and +could easily be exploited for reasons other than prevention of crime +and terror. The successes and failures of government responses can be +judged in various ways. An argument is often made against allowing widespread use of encryption and generally against widespread effective operations @@ -50,7 +73,7 @@ suspicious activity can be flagged and investigated in order to prevent a terror attack or in order to better respond in the case of an attack. Graham describes the extensive use of end to end encryption used by terrorists in order to avoid interception by the authorities. -Due to US usage of intercepted communications to uncover and prevent a +Due to U.S. usage of intercepted communications to uncover and prevent a number of al-Qa'ida plots, the terrorist organisation and other terrorist groups have increasingly used encrypted communications (read citation from Graham). An significant factor is the use of @@ -196,7 +219,7 @@ messages/emails, listening to calls, tracking location, or analysing metadata (cite?) may no longer be effective, thereby potentially preventing such investigation to occur. For governments, this is arguably the result of such heavy surveillance in the first place. -It's clear that knowledge such as the 2013 Snowden leaks had an impact +It is clear that knowledge such as the 2013 Snowden leaks had an impact on the public (cite), and that people are therby more interested in their privacy and preventing surveillance. The exception to this has been in China, where the government has unparalleled control over the @@ -302,8 +325,6 @@ IME/Pluton -- backdoors Heatbleed (2014) (occured in open source software) -RISC V - Government https://rules.house.gov/bill/117/hr-4521 |