diff options
| -rw-r--r-- | papers/1.tex | 50 |
1 files changed, 25 insertions, 25 deletions
diff --git a/papers/1.tex b/papers/1.tex index a5359a9..77aa73b 100644 --- a/papers/1.tex +++ b/papers/1.tex @@ -12,17 +12,17 @@ \begin{quote} -Yujin Nagasawa's problem of systemic evil (POSE) argues that systemic +Yujin Nagasawa's problem of systemic evil (\textsc{pose}) argues that systemic evils like natural selection pose a greater challenge to atheism/non-theism than to theism, as they conflict with ``modest optimism'': the view that the world is fundamentally ``not bad.'' Nagasawa suggests theism resolves this by appealing to a heavenly bliss, offsetting natural evils, a strategy unavailable to atheists/non-theists. However, I argue that atheists/non-theists are -better equipped to address POSE because they are not constrained by the +better equipped to address \textsc{pose} because they are not constrained by the theistic commitment to a categorically good world. -In Section $1$, I critique two theistic approaches to POSE. Extreme +In Section $1$, I critique two theistic approaches to \textsc{pose}. Extreme optimism defends the actual world as the best possible one, requiring problematic justifications such as free-will and ``only-way'' theodicies to explain systemic evils as necessary. Neutral optimism, while allowing @@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ for multiple good worlds, still struggles to reconcile systemic evils with a benevolent God, merely shifting the problem to other possible worlds. -In Section $2$, I explore how atheists/non-theists can bypass POSE. They +In Section $2$, I explore how atheists/non-theists can bypass \textsc{pose}. They can adopt personal, rather than cosmic, optimism, valuing their own existence without affirming the world's overall goodness. Alternatively, they can embrace comparative optimism, viewing existence as better than @@ -38,11 +38,11 @@ non-existence without attributing intrinsic value to natural processes like evolution. These flexible approaches free non-theists from the philosophical burdens tied to systemic evils. -In Section $3$, I argue that even if POSE persists, atheists/non-theists +In Section $3$, I argue that even if \textsc{pose} persists, atheists/non-theists can ``borrow'' theists' theodicies without committing to their metaphysical assumptions. By adopting naturalistic or subjective frameworks, non-theists can justify their modest optimism without the -theological constraints imposed by theism. This demonstrates that POSE +theological constraints imposed by theism. This demonstrates that \textsc{pose} ultimately challenges theistic frameworks more than atheistic ones. \end{quote} @@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ ultimately challenges theistic frameworks more than atheistic ones. \section*{Introduction} In \emph{The Problem of Evil for Atheists,} Yujin Nagasawa develops a -problem of systemic evil (POSE) that he claims challenges both +problem of systemic evil (\textsc{pose}) that he claims challenges both atheists/non-theists and theists alike.\footnote{When I say, ``God'' and ``Theism'' in this paper, I assume an omniscient, omnipotent, and omnibenevolent singular/simple creator.} He identifies a tension @@ -93,12 +93,12 @@ distinguishing between regretting \emph{how} one came to exist and \emph{that} one exists---the Jew can regret \emph{how} her grandparents met, without regretting \emph{that} they met at all.\footnote{Janna Thompson, ``The Apology Paradox,'' \emph{The Philosophical Quarterly} - 50\emph{,} No. 201 (2000): 475.} Applied to POSE, this seems to suggest that one can regret the + 50\emph{,} No. 201 (2000): 475.} Applied to \textsc{pose}, this seems to suggest that one can regret the mechanisms of natural selection without regretting the outcome of our existence. However, Nagasawa argues that this resolution fails in the context of -POSE. Unlike historical events, natural selection is not a contingent +\textsc{pose}. Unlike historical events, natural selection is not a contingent circumstance but a fundamental feature of the natural world.\footnote{Nagasawa, \emph{The Problem of Evil for Atheists}, 167.} To reject it is not to regret a particular pathway to existence, but to undermine the very @@ -112,22 +112,22 @@ outweigh earthly suffering with the promise of an afterlife. These come in two forms: (1) as a deferred justification, where evolution is acceptable because it leads to eternal reward, and (2) as a utilitarian offset, where infinite heavenly bliss outweighs finite worldly -suffering. Because atheists cannot appeal to such concepts, POSE, he +suffering. Because atheists cannot appeal to such concepts, \textsc{pose}, he claims, presents a more serious problem for atheists. Contrary to Nagasawa, I argue that atheists and non-theists are better -positioned to address POSE because they are not constrained by the +positioned to address \textsc{pose} because they are not constrained by the theistic requirement to see the world as overall categorically good. To support this claim, I first critique two theistic attempts at resolving systemic evil, namely extreme and neutral optimism, illustrating their shortcomings. Subsequently, I explore how atheists/non-theists might -effectively sidestep POSE by adopting personal rather than cosmic +effectively sidestep \textsc{pose} by adopting personal rather than cosmic optimism, or by embracing a comparative optimism which sees existence as preferable to non-existence without categorically endorsing the systems that facilitated it. Finally, I turn Nagasawa's borrowing argument -around to propose that, even if POSE remains challenging, +around to propose that, even if \textsc{pose} remains challenging, atheists/non-theists can strategically adopt theistic theodicies without -their accompanying metaphysical assumptions, thereby reducing POSE's +their accompanying metaphysical assumptions, thereby reducing \textsc{pose}'s impact and revealing it to be ultimately a greater challenge for theistic frameworks than for atheistic or non-theistic ones. @@ -253,7 +253,7 @@ Nagasawa identifies between systemic evil and modest optimism. So, theists must either concede that natural selection is not the best necessary instrument in the best possible world, or following Bayle and Russell accept the former's pessimism or latter's ``agnostic cosmic -theodicy'' in accepting that POSE cannot be answered.\footnote{Robert John Russell, ``Natural Theodicy in an Evolutionary Context,'' in \emph{Cosmology: From Alpha +theodicy'' in accepting that \textsc{pose} cannot be answered.\footnote{Robert John Russell, ``Natural Theodicy in an Evolutionary Context,'' in \emph{Cosmology: From Alpha to Omega} (Fortress Press, 2008), 255.} @@ -390,14 +390,14 @@ empirically challenged as most personal optimists are often implicitly also cosmic optimists. Responding to Kahane, Nagasawa grants that personal optimism does not necessarily entail cosmic optimism. However, he argues that this reformulation of modest optimism changes the target -of POSE, which defines modest optimism as affirming both attitudinal and +of \textsc{pose}, which defines modest optimism as affirming both attitudinal and axiological optimism.\footnote{Nagasawa, \emph{The Problem of Evil for Atheists,} 184.} For he argues that rational personal optimists who procreate implicitly believe that the world they are bringing their child into is overall a good place.\footnote{Nagasawa, \emph{The Problem of Evil for Atheists,} 184.} The personal, but not cosmic, reformulation of modest optimism, therefore, seemingly -misses the original target of POSE and is only applicable to a minority +misses the original target of \textsc{pose} and is only applicable to a minority of anti-natalist pessimists like David Benatar. Responding to this, Nagasawa's formulation of modest optimism is already @@ -480,19 +480,19 @@ worlds they yearn for must necessarily contain some other kind of systemic evil that requires a theodicy . The personal optimist on the other hand need not make this consideration of the overall goodness of other possible worlds. So, whilst theism can appeal to the heavenly -bliss, the non-theist can simply bypass POSE without needing to address +bliss, the non-theist can simply bypass \textsc{pose} without needing to address it. \section{Borrowing Theism's Optimism Without its Metaphysics} -But even if atheists/non-theists remain burdened by POSE due to perhaps +But even if atheists/non-theists remain burdened by \textsc{pose} due to perhaps their cosmic or even categorical optimism, I propose that they can ``borrow'' the theodicies used by theists to justify their modest optimism. This reverses Nagasawa's theistic strategy, which claims that theism's supernaturalist ontology (encompassing both natural and supernatural realms) subsumes the atheist/non-theist's naturalist ontology (limited to the natural world), thus allowing theists to -``borrow'' atheist/non-theist responses to POSE.\footnote{Nagasawa, +``borrow'' atheist/non-theist responses to \textsc{pose}.\footnote{Nagasawa, \emph{The Problem of Evil for Atheists,} 173.} However, Nagasawa does not address the fact that supernaturalist ontologies bring additional axiological presuppositions---namely, that an omnibenevolent God exists @@ -500,7 +500,7 @@ and that his creation must necessarily be overall and categorically good. Non-theists, by contrast, can adopt the theist's belief that the world is overall good using the theist's rationalisations, without committing to these broader metaphysical claims about God. In essence, -atheists/non-theists can justify their optimism in the face of POSE +atheists/non-theists can justify their optimism in the face of \textsc{pose} without having to commit to the theist's wider ontological framework. Borrowing from extreme theistic optimism, the atheist/non-theist can @@ -542,18 +542,18 @@ reconcile systemic evil with a metaphysical commitment to a categorically good creation, non-theists can adopt similar explanatory frameworks without such constraints. In doing so, they preserve the practical benefits of modest optimism without incurring the theological -debts that weigh down the theistic response to POSE. +debts that weigh down the theistic response to \textsc{pose}. \section*{Conclusion} -POSE, therefore, remains a problem only for theists as their conception +\textsc{pose}, therefore, remains a problem only for theists as their conception of modest theism must commit to the belief that a good God would create a categorically good world. This commitment imposes significant burdens ontheist extreme optimists, whose belief that the actual world is the best possible world obliges them either to embrace pessimism, appeal to mystery, or present a theodicy for systemic evils. And while responses like the free-will and ``only-way'' theodicies may present \emph{prima -facie} defences to POSE, they only regress into deeper manifestations of +facie} defences to \textsc{pose}, they only regress into deeper manifestations of the problem of evil unless the theist begs the question or makes an appeal to mystery. Likewise, theist neutral optimists, who holds that the actual world is only one of many possible worlds that are not @@ -563,7 +563,7 @@ amplifies the existence of systemic evils. In contrast, the atheist/non-theist can either borrow the theist's theodicies, or maintain a personal comparative optimistic -stance that disregards POSE overall. By selfishly narrowing modest +stance that disregards \textsc{pose} overall. By selfishly narrowing modest optimism to the personal level, the atheist/non-theist can disregard systemic evils while remaining grateful for their own lives as they experience it. Furthermore, their non-commitment to categorical goodness |